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CONTEMPLATED AMENDMENTS TO JAPAN’S 1947 
CONSTITUTION: A RETURN TO IYE, KOKUTAI AND 
THE MEIJI STATE 
 
Carl F. Goodman 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The post World War II American Occupation of Japan was a huge 
programmatic success.  Its disarmament,1 repatriation,2 land reform,3 and 
health programs4 put a defeated Japan on the road to recuperation, while 
providing a military shield that enabled Japan to focus on recovery from the 
War and rebuilding the country and economy.5  Perhaps its most enduring 
legacy was its Enlightenment-based, American-drafted, rights-oriented 
Constitution of 1947 [hereinafter “the Constitution”].6  Drafted in English, 
the Constitution was promulgated in Japanese, resulting in some substantive 
changes.  Among the most important of these were changing the English 
 
1 See GEOFFREY PERRET, OLD SOLDIERS NEVER DIE 495 (1996); GEORGE DAVIES, THE 
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 293–94 (2001); LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, JAPAN: ARTICLE 9 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2006), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/japan-constitution-article9.pdf. 
2 By 1949 over 6 million Japanese had been repatriated to Japan. Paul J. Mueller, Occupied Japan -- 
A Progress Report, U.S. ARMY (Aug. 27, 2007), http://www.army.mil/article/4613/. 
3 See Toshihiko Kawagoe, Agricultural Land Reform in Postwar Japan: Experiences and Issues 32 
(World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2111, 1999), 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-2111; Tsutomu Takigawa, Historical 
Background of Agricultural Land Reform in Japan, 10 THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 290, 290 (1972), 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1746-1049.1972.tb00283.x/pdf; MIKISO HANE & LOUIS G. 
PEREZ, MODERN JAPAN: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 371 (4th ed. 2009); HOWARD B. SCHONBERGER, 
AFTERMATH OF WAR: AMERICANS AND THE REMAKING OF JAPAN, 1945–1952, at 65–66 (1989); WILLIAM 
MANCHESTER, AMERICAN CAESAR, 508–509 (1978); PERRET, supra note 1, at 520–521; Masahiro Takada, 
Japan’s Economic Miracle: Underlying Factors and Strategies for the Growth (Mar. 23, 1999) (unpublished 
student research paper, Lehigh University) (on file with Professor Raymond F. Wylie, Lehigh University), 
http://www.lehigh.edu/~rfw1/courses/1999/spring/ir163/Papers/pdf/mat5.pdf. 
4 See Crawford F. Sams, Experiences in Immunization Against Tuberculosis with BCG Vaccine in 
Japan, 44 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 903, 903–908 (1954); Sey Nishimura, Promoting Health During the 
American Occupation of Japan: The Public Health Section, Kyoto Military Government Team, 19451949, 
98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 424, 424–434 (2008), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2253585/; 
SETH G. JONES ET AL., SECURING HEALTH: LESSONS FROM NATION-BUILDING MISSIONS 61–64 (2006) 
(ebook); SEYMOUR MORRIS JR., SUPREME COMMANDER: MACARTHUR’S TRIUMPH IN JAPAN 102–114 
(2014); MANCHESTER, supra note 3, at 509; DAVIES, supra note 1, at 296. 
5 Japan and the Occupation received assistance from an unexpected source—the North Korean 
invasion of South Korea jump-started the Japanese economy. 
6 While drafted by the Kades Committee set up by the Occupation, the drafting was influenced by 
indigenous Japanese drafts. THEODORE MCNELLY, THE ORIGINS OF JAPAN’S DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
60–61, 98–99 (2000). 
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word “people” into the Japanese “kokumin” (Japanese citizens)7 and 
transmuting many definitive rights into more passive language.8  
Many in Japan’s political leadership seek to change the American-
drafted Constitution by bringing it closer to the indigenous Japanese postwar 
draft (Matsumoto draft) that was seen by the American Occupation 
[hereinafter “the Occupation”] as containing merely minor amendments to 
the pre-war Meiji Constitution.  The 1947 Constitution’s Amendments 
Clause requires a two-thirds majority of both the Lower and Upper House 
before an amendment can be presented to the public for a referendum vote.  
At referendum each amendment must be voted on separately, a simple 
majority is required for passage.9  In 1955, the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) (Japan’s dominant party) was formed through a merger of the postwar 
Liberal and Democratic Parties brokered by Yoshida Shigeru, Hatoyama 
Ichiro, and Kishi Nobusuke to respond to the merger of Japan’s left wing 
Socialist leaning parties, and to try to achieve a conservative two-thirds 
majority in both Diet Houses.10  The LDP, while Japan’s dominant political 
party since 1955, never achieved the two-thirds majority needed.  In Abe’s 
second term as Prime Minister, the LDP obtained a two-thirds majority in 
the Lower House and together with small parties favoring constitutional 
amendment, obtained a two-thirds majority in the Upper House that supports 
some amendment—Prime Minister Abe (Kishi's grandson) is pressing for 
constitutional amendment in 2017.11  
 
7 See STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMM., DECISION AMENDING SWNCC 228: REFORM OF 
THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM (Jan. 7, 1946), 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/059/059tx.html; Memorandum from Charles L. Kades, Chief, 
Pub. Admin. Div., to Chief, Gov’t Section, 2 (Feb. 12, 1946), 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/002_15/002_15_001l.html (last updated Mar. 21, 2013). The 
Meiji Constitution’s rights provisions were also limited to Japanese citizens. HAROLD S. QUIGLEY, 
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 52–53 (1932); HIROBUMI ITO, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN 38–40 (Miyoji Ito ed. 1979) (1889). 
8 See KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR’S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 7380 (1991). 
9 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [hereinafter “KENPŌ”] [CONSTITUTION], art. 96 (Japan). The Referendum Law 
provides that majority means majority of votes cast, although question exists as to whether majority 
requires a majority of eligible voters. Motonari Imaseki, Act Concerning Procedures to Revise the 
Constitution of Japan, in WASEDA U. INST. COMP. L.: JAPANESE L. INFO. (Mar. 15, 2008), 
http://www.waseda.jp/hiken/en/jalaw_inf/new_leg/001imaseki.html. 
10 WATANABE TSUNEO, JAPAN’S BACKROOM POLITICS: FACTIONS IN A MULTIPARTY AGE 239–41 
(Robert D. Eldridge trans. 2013) (1967). 
11 The supermajority requirement helps assure basic human rights and structural democracy rights in 
the face of emotions at a particular point in time. The LDP’s contemplated amendments would do away 
with supermajority protection of democracy and people’s rights. David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 
47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 192 (2013). The Meiji Constitution’s amendment provision required a. 
presentation by the Emperor to the Diet and b. supermajority provisions for both quorum and vote 
requirements in the Diet. DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPŌ [hereinafter “MEIJI KENPŌ”] [CONSTITUTION], art. 73 

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The Constitution’s Renunciation of War Clause has long been the face 
of the LDP’s constitutional amendment drive, but the LDP has much more 
on its amendment plate.12  Indeed, because of the Cabinet Declaration of 
2014 that reinterpreted Article 9 to allow Japan to engage in “collective Self 
Defense” and subsequent legislative and administrative changes designed to 
carry out collective self-defense with the United States, it is likely that 
“formal amendment” of Article 9 will take a back seat to other amendments 
on the LDP’s list.  
This paper discusses some major amendments the LDP is 
contemplating and examines the interaction of amendments that makes them 
more than separate proposals.  The terms of amendments that will be 
submitted to the Diet will be determined through discussions between 
Japan’s political parties.  However, enough is known to examine how the 
changes contemplated permit legislative and/or executive action restricting 
the rights of the Japanese people opening the door to returning Japanese 
society to its pre-war autocratic Meiji Constitution past.  This paper 
examines the amendments with an eye on Japanese history, customs, and 
law.13  
Part I briefly discusses Japan's constitutional history.  Part II discusses 
how contemplated amendments to the Preamble, Emperor provisions, 
individuality, the family, and free speech and association could affect 
Japanese law and society.  Part III presents a short summary. 
    
(Japan). Hirobumi Ito justified such stringency by pointing out the special nature of a Constitution. 
HIROBUMI ITO, supra note 7, at 153–55. 
12 KENPŌ, art. 9 (“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as 
means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, 
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the 
state will not be recognized.”). 
13  For English language translation of portions of the LDP’s 2012 draft constitution, see Jiyumintô, 
Shinkenpô sôan [New Draft Constitution], Oct. 28, 2005, at 
www.jimin.jp/jimin/shin_kenpou/shiryou/pdf/051028_a.pdf [hereinafter LDP Draft]; Young Lawyer's 
Association for The Future of Freedom translation of 2012 draft proposal, (Nov. 1, 2013), 
http://www.asuno-jiyuu.com/2013/11/blog-post.html; Voices of Overseas Youth for Civic Engagement, 
Draft for the Amendment of the Constitution of Japan, VOYCE (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.voyce-
jpn.com/ldp-draft-constitution; Colin P.A. Jones, The LDP constitution, article by article: a preview of 
things to come?, JAPAN TIMES, Jul. 2, 2013, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2013/07/02/issues/the-ldp-constitution-a-preview-of-things-to-
come/#.Vp-RNIf2bIV; Lawrence Repeta, Japan’s Democracy at Risk – The LDP’s Ten Most Dangerous 
Proposals for Constitutional Change, 11 ASIA-PAC. J. JAPAN FOCUS 28, 3 (2013), 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Lawrence-Repeta/3969. 
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I.  JAPAN'S CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
A.  The Adoption of the Meiji Constitution 
With his victory at the Battle of Sekigahara (October 1600), 
Tokugawa Ieyasu defeated the forces of Western Japan who supported the 
son of Toyotomi Hideoshi, the man who unified Japan during the 16th 
Century.  In 1603, the Emperor granted Tokugawa the title of Shogun and 
the Tokugawa clan then ruled Japan for the next two and a half centuries.  
The arrival of American war ships under the command of Commodore Perry 
(July 1853) who demanded trade ties between Japan and the United States—
a demand that the Tokugawa regime lacked the power to resist—together 
with built up animosity, especially in Western Japan, eventually led to  civil 
war in which the rebels rallied under the demand for restoration of the 
Emperor’s power.  In 1868, the Emperor announced the restoration of his 
power (Meiji Restoration) and effective rule passed to Western Japan 
Samurai, principally from Satsuma and Chosen Han.  Dispute arose as to 
whether a constitution should be promulgated.  The Emperor had promised 
in his Charter Oath of Five Articles (1868) that there would be “deliberative 
assemblies” but the abolition of the pre restoration feudal structure abolished 
feudal councils that could serve this purpose.  A constitutionally created 
legislative body was seen as the means for carrying out the promise of 
deliberative assemblies.14  By 1879, an agreement was reached between the 
competing camps, and ten years later, the Emperor granted his subjects 
Japan’s first modern constitution,15 the Constitution of the Empire of Japan16 
(hereinafter “Meiji Constitution”).  Ito Hirabumi, the principle author of the 
Meiji Constitution, specifically rejected the liberal American model of 
governance and instead chose a conservative German model.17  Seeking to 
 
14 JOHN K. FAIRBANK, EDWIN O. REISCHAUER & ALBERT M. CRAIG, EAST ASIA TRADITION AND 
TRANSFORMATION 503, 535 (1973). 
15 The Seventeen Article Constitution of Prince Shotoku written in the very early 7th century is 
reputed to be the first constitutional document of Japan. Unlike constitutional documents in the West, it did 
not set forth rights vis-à-vis the government but rather was Confucian in nature, setting forth ethical and 
moral standards of conduct. While referred to as a constitution, it was neither supreme law nor would it be 
considered ‘law’ in a Western sense. DAVID J. LU, JAPAN: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 22–23 (1997). 
16 See 42 ASIATIC SOC'Y OF JAPAN, JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS, 1, 8 n.1 (W.W. McLaren 
ed. 1979) (1914). 
17 See QUIGLEY, supra note 7, at 39–40, 44; E. HERBERT NORMAN, INT'L SECRETARIAT INST. OF PAC. 
RELATIONS, FEUDAL BACKGROUND OF JAPANESE POLITICS: SECRETARIAT PAPER NO. 9, at 90–98 (1945), 
microformed on Chapter IV The Autocratic State (Univ. Microfilms Int'l 1978); IAN BURUMA, INVENTING 
JAPAN: 1853-1964, at 52–54 (2003); CARL F. GOODMAN, JUSTICE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN 64 
(2004). 
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thread a needle between the Emperor as supreme power in the State and the 
Emperor as a constitutional monarch (consistent with evolving international 
doctrine), Ito wrote both theories into the Constitution.18 
While the Meiji Constitution contained a listing of “Rights and Duties 
of Subjects,” these rights were not self-executing, and rather required 
legislation that defined the scope and limitations of the granted rights.19  The 
Meiji Constitution allowed a form of democracy but did not compel it.  It 
appears similar to Westminister Democracy, but is different because 
Ministers of State were advisors to and served at the discretion of the 
Emperor; they were neither appointed by nor dependent on 20  the confidence 
of the Diet.21  Moreover, the Cabinet acted on a consensus basis so that if a 
single Cabinet Minister dissented or resigned, the Cabinet would be 
dissolved and a new Cabinet appointed by the Emperor.  Since the army and 
navy were entitled to two seats on the Cabinet that, by regulation, could only 
be held by active duty senior officers, the military was in a commanding 
position.22  Military Chiefs of Staff, like their Cabinet Minister counterparts, 
were responsible solely to the Emperor and not to the Cabinet or military 
officers serving as Cabinet Ministers.  Commanders in the field held 
allegiance to their Chief of Staff, not to the civil government or the military 
appointees serving in the Cabinet, leading to a breakdown in rank discipline 
that spread throughout the ranks, including mid-level officers.  Within the 
military there were “constitutional” disagreements—Chiefs of Staff 
considered the Cabinet and the military’s representatives serving in the 
 
18 See, e.g., MEIJI KENPŌ, art. 3 (“The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.”); id. art. 4 (“The Emperor 
is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to 
the provisions of the present Constitution.”); id. art. 5 (“The Emperor exercises the legislative power with 
the consent of the Imperial Diet.”); id. art. 9 (“The Emperor issues or causes to be issued, the Ordinances 
necessary for the carrying out of the laws, or for the maintenance of the public peace and order, and for the 
promotion of the welfare of the subjects. But no Ordinance shall in any way alter any of the existing 
laws.”); STEPHEN S. LARGE, EMPERORS OF THE RISING SUN: THREE BIOGRAPHIES 43 (1997). 
19 See, e.g., MEIJI KENPŌ, art. 23 (“No Japanese subject shall be arrested, detained, tried or punished, 
unless according to law.”); id. art. 28 (“Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and 
order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.”); id. art. 29 
(“Japanese subjects shall, within the limits of law, enjoy the liberty of speech, writing, publication, public 
meetings and associations.”). 
20 Id. art. 55, para. 1 (“The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and 
be responsible for it.”). 
21 See HIROBUMI ITO, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN 102–05 
(Miyoji Ito trans., Chū-ō Daigaku ed. 1906) (1889). 
22 LARGE, supra note 18, at 42. 
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Cabinet as lacking authority over operational matters and thus not having 
authority over the Chiefs of Staff.23   
The Meiji Constitution could be interpreted as granting freedoms and 
might be interpreted to allow a responsible representative government.  
Some in pre-war Japan argued for such an interpretation but the reality was 
that the Meiji Constitution was not interpreted to grant rights that could not 
be infringed by legislation nor did the elected branch of the Diet control the 
selection of the prime minister.  Dissenters among the Meiji Revolutionaries 
either resigned or were forced out of government and formed political 
parties.  
B.   Restrictions on Constitutional Rights During the Short Lived Taisho 
Democracy Period  
After the death of Emperor Meiji and the accession of Emperor 
Taisho, a period of so-called Taisho Democracy came into existence in 
Japan.  During this period, which flourished in the 1920s but lasted a mere 
eight to twelve years, there were some democratic stirrings and political 
party dominated governments, but basic freedoms such as freedom of 
speech, association, and the press were, for the most part, unavailable to the 
Japanese public.24  An amended Peace Preservation Law, an update and 
modification of the laws that restricted freedom of speech and association 
that had been adopted in the interregnum between the Restoration and 
adoption of the Constitution,25 sharply restricted freedom of speech and 
assembly as an antidote to the Universal Male Suffrage Law.26  
In the post-Taisho period (1930s), the “organ theory” or the idea that 
the Emperor was a constitutional monarch subject to the Constitution,27 was 
rejected in favor of Kokutai, the theory that the Emperor was the essence of 
the State and that all Japanese people held a relationship to the Kami of 
Shinto religion and to the Emperor through the Kami.28  Professor Minobe, a 
strong supporter of the organ theory, was physically attacked and compelled 
 
23 W.G. BEASLEY, THE RISE OF MODERN JAPAN 171–72 (3d ed. 2000) (1990). 
24 Alternating political party governments served from 1925 to 1932. LARGE, supra note 18, at 109. 
25 See BURUMA, supra note 17, at 48–49, 54–55. 
26 See Richard H. Mitchell, Japan’s Peace Preservation Law of 1925: Its Origins and Significance, 
in 28 MONUMENTA NIPPONICA 317, 317–345 (1973). 
27 See Kenneth Colegrove, The Japanese Emperor, 26 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 642, 648–653 (1932). 
28 See generally ROBERT S. ELLWOOD & RICHARD PILGRIM, JAPANESE RELIGION: A CULTURAL 
PERSPECTIVE (1985) (noting that kami spirits not only adhere to the natural world but also to the original 
Japanese clans, each of which had its own kami—the most important of which was the kami for the 
Imperial clan). 
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to resign from his position at Tokyo University and from the Diet’s Upper 
House,29 notwithstanding the Emperor’s support of his theory.30 
C.   The Occupation’s Constitutional Objectives and the 1947 Constitution 
To the Occupation [SCAP (Supreme Commander Allied Powers) 
which, while it applied to General MacArthur was  how the Occupation was 
referred to], whose marching orders were contained in the Potsdam 
Declaration and a joint War and State Department policy paper (Initial Post 
Surrender Policy Directive for Japan31 and its revisions),32 the constitution 
Japan needed was not one that could be interpreted to allow for individual 
rights and a democratic representative form of government; it was one that 
required a representative democracy and recognition of basic human rights.  
The Occupation sought a Japanese-drafted constitution centered on 
gender equality, representative democracy, and freedom of thought, speech 
and religion.33  Prime Minster Shidehara turned to a committee headed by 
Matsumoto Joji, whose draft was considered by the Occupation as an 
inadequate minor amendment to the Meiji Constitution.34  When the 
Matsumoto draft was made public it was doomed, as it not only failed to 
represent the Occupation’s goals, but also failed to conform to Japanese 
public opinion, which sought a real change from the Meiji Constitution that 
would grant freedoms to the public.35  What the Occupation (and the 
 
29 For a portion of Minobe’s defense, see 2 SOURCES OF JAPANESE TRADITION 239–246 (Ryusaku 
Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore De Bary & Donald Keene eds., text ed. 1964). For a discussion of the Minobe 
Affair and its free-speech and military vs. civil authority aspects, see GREGORY J. KASZA, THE STATE AND 
THE MASS MEDIA IN JAPAN, 1918–1945, at 129–137 (1988); MARIUS B. JANSEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN 
JAPAN 597 (2000); BEASLEY, supra note 24, at 184–186. For a discussion of the change in orthodoxy that 
led to Minobe’s downfall, see Christopher Goto-Jones, The Way of Revering the Emperor: Imperial 
Philosophy and Bushidō in Modern Japan, in THE EMPERORS OF MODERN JAPAN 23, 35–36 (Ben-Ami 
Shillony ed., 2008). 
30 LARGE, supra note 18, at 155. 
31 See Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan, State Department Bulletin (Sept. 23, 1945); United 
States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (SWNCC150/4), Memorandum from H. Freeman Matthews 
to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Sep. 6, 1945), 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/01/022/022tx.html. 
32 See State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Decision Amending SWNCC 228: Reform of the 
Japanese Government System (Jan. 7, 1946), 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/059/059_005l.html. 
33 Charles L. Kades, The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution, 104 Pol. Sci. Q. 
215, 219 (1989). 
34 Memorandum from Charles L. Kades to the Chief, Government Section (Feb. 12, 1946), 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/002_15/002_15_001l.html. 
35 David S. Law, The Myth of Imposed Constitutionalism in Japan, in SOCIAL AND POL. 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 25557 (Dennis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013). 
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Japanese public) wanted was a constitution that protected individual rights.36  
General MacArthur turned the creation of a roadmap for a constitution over 
to General Whitney of SCAP’s government section, giving him general 
instructions: a powerless Emperor; no military, whether for defensive or 
offensive purposes; elimination of remnants of feudalism; and a reformed 
budget process.  Whitney turned the matter over to Colonel Kades who was 
given one week to prepare a road map for a Constitution.  Kades was to be 
guided by the latest version of the joint War/State Department policy paper 
for the Occupation, now known as SWNCC 228, the Potsdam Declaration 
and MacArthur’s summary instructions.37 
The Kades’ committee draft, after some modifications and changes 
suggested by the Japanese government and others, brought about by virtue 
of translation from English to Japanese, was presented by the Emperor to the 
Diet.  SCAP agreed to select modifications suggested by the Japanese 
government and accepted few suggestions made by the Far East 
Commission.  Some translation “errors” in the Japanese government's 
translation of the Kades draft that were caught and rejected by the 
Occupation would have subordinated constitutional individual rights to 
legislation, retained some imperial powers, and allowed executive rule in 
emergency situations.38  As set forth in greater detail in Part II hereof, the 
LDP’s proposed amendments under consideration in this paper could have 
the effect of subordinating constitutional rights to legislation, give powers to 
the Emperor and would provide for emergency powers that could, at least 
temporarily, displace democracy in favor of rule by Cabinet orders that must 
be obeyed by the public.    
The 1947 Constitution retains a dynastic Emperor as a symbol of the 
State, places sovereignty solely in the People, renounces war, and gives the 
judicial branch the power of constitutional judicial review.  In addition, it 
provides for a representative democracy where the executive is appointed by 
and subject to retention by confidence of an elected legislative branch.  The 
Constitution seeks to remove the vestiges of feudalism through structural 
changes in the governing system and the numerous rights granted to the 
Japanese people.  The requirement for supermajority consent of the 
 
36 See TAKESHI MASUDA, SOFT POWER AND ITS PERILS: U.S. CULTURAL POLICY IN EARLY POSTWAR 
JAPAN AND PERMANENT DEPENDENCY 21718 (2007). 
37 KOSEKI SHOOICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN’S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION 79 (Ray A. Moore ed., 1997); 
Kades, supra note 33; ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN: A PARTICIPANT LOOKS 
BACK (1976); JANSEN, supra note 29; PETER J. HERZOG, JAPAN’S PSEUDO-DEMOCRACY (1993). 
38 DALE M. HELLEGERS, WE, THE JAPANESE PEOPLE: WORLD WAR II AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 540, (2002). 
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legislative branch, plus majority consent of the people for constitutional 
amendment, was designed to create a legislative branch supermajority hurdle 
that would protect the Constitution from intemperate changes, while 
requiring consent of the people through direct referendum of any changes 
suggested by elected leaders.  While the Occupation stated it was not forcing 
acceptance of its draft, it also stated it was prepared to submit the basic ideas 
of its draft directly to the Japanese people if the government rejected them 
and held out the prospect of charging the Emperor as a war criminal if the 
Constitution was rejected.39   
The Emperor submitted the Constitution to the Diet as an amendment 
of the Meiji Constitution.  After some amendments (accepted by the 
Occupation) made during Diet consideration, it was approved and has never 
been subject to formal amendment.  
II.  THE LDP’S CONTEMPLATED AMENDMENTS 
A.  Granting the Cabinet the Power to Govern by Cabinet Order in a 
Prime Minister Declared Emergency 
Under the Meiji Constitution, the Emperor could, in cases of urgent 
necessity arising when the Diet was not in session, issue imperial ordinances 
that had the force and effect of law but needed to be confirmed by the Diet 
when it returned.40  This power was used to stifle freedom of speech and the 
press when capital punishment and life imprisonment for forming or joining 
an organization that sought to change Kokutai (even by peaceful means) 
were added to the Peace Preservation Law by emergency order.41  The 1947 
Constitution made the legislative branch the supreme organ of the State and 
has no emergency provision.  The Diet is the only branch whose entire 
membership is elected to enable it to represent all the people.42  The 
proposed amendment to grant the Cabinet the power to govern by Cabinet 
 
39 Kades, supra note 33, at 215, 229232. 
40 Article 8 of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (MEIJI KENPŌ) provided “Article 8. The 
Emperor, in consequence of an urgent necessity to maintain public safety or to avert public calamities, 
issues, when the Imperial Diet is not sitting, Imperial Ordinances in the place of law. (2) Such Imperial 
Ordinances are to be laid before the Imperial Diet at its next session, and when the Diet does not approve 
the said Ordinances, the Government shall declare them to be invalid for the future.” Diet sessions were 
only three months long and the Emperor was under no duty to call the Diet back into session during an 
emergency. See Colegrove, supra note 27, at 642, 655. 
41 QUIGLEY, supra note 7, at 5859; KASZA, supra note 29, at 45 (Kasza notes that the Emergency 
Power was exercised on four occasions to restrict press freedom – pg. 13); Colegrove, supra note 27, at 
642, 658659 (1932).  
42  KENPŌ art. 41, 43. 
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order in an emergency declared by the Prime Minister is seen by the LDP as 
noncontroversial and easily acceptable by a populous still traumatized by the 
Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami.43 
The LDP’s considered amendment harkens back to the Meiji 
Constitution’s grant of power to the Emperor and would allow the Cabinet, 
after a Prime Minister declared emergency, to rule via Cabinet orders having 
the effect of law and would compel people in Japan to carry out orders 
issued by the State (and subordinate agencies of the State).44  It appears the 
amendment will be presented as a minor change that would allow the 
government to call the Diet back in session in the event of an emergency, but 
it is far more.45  The Constitution already allows the Cabinet to call special 
Diet sessions and twenty-five percent of the membership of either House of 
 
43 The LDP has been considering making the emergency clause amendment the first in a series of 
rolling amendments to be placed before the Diet.  The public, believing this amendment will be easy to 
achieve, will make the process of amendment publicly acceptable and “normal,” thus paving the way for 
other amendments that are seen as potentially more polarizing.  However, the recent unprecedented address 
by the Emperor, in which he hinted at his desire to retire (abdicate) in favor of his eldest son and the failure 
of the Constitution to provide for abdication, has led some to believe that a constitutional amendment may 
be required to allow abdication (although it can reasonably be argued that all that is needed is a change in 
the Imperial Household Law).  Should the LDP conclude that an abdication amendment is required, then 
such an amendment would probably be the first amendment to be debated by the Diet and presented to the 
public.  Allowing abdication is contentious as there is some objection to permitting the Emperor to 
abdicate.  Considering an abdication amendment may open the door to simultaneous consideration of 
amendments dealing with the Emperor that the LDP is contemplating, and that may implicate the question 
of succession. This is a very contentious issue, as the failure to find agreement among LDP factions on how 
to deal with the succession crisis that loomed prior to the birth of a male heir to the Emperor’s youngest 
son. All of which could set back Prime Minister Abe’s schedule and time table for Constitutional 
Amendment. See Anna Fifield, Japan’s Emperor Wants to Retire: Is He Allowed To?, WASH. POST (Aug. 
6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/japans-emperor-wants-to-retire-is-he-
allowed-to/2016/08/05/12199b6c-58d7-11e6-8b48-0cb344221131_story.html; see also, Full Text of 
Emperor Akihito's Video Message, MAINICHI (Aug. 8, 2016), 
http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160808/p2a/00m/0na/008000c; Opinion, Abdication Could Pose Legal 
Challenges for Imperial System, MAINICHI (Aug. 8, 2016), 
http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160808/p2g/00m/0dm/073000c; Elaine Lies, Japan Emperor 
Abdication Debate Could Stir Discussion on Female Succession, REUTERS (July 14, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-emperor-idUSKCN0ZU0AE. 
44 Lawrence Repeta, Japan’s Democracy at Risk – The LDP’s Ten Most Dangerous Proposals for 
Constitutional Change, 11 ASIA-PAC. J. JAPAN FOCUS 28, 3 (2013), http://www.japanfocus.org/-Lawrence-
Repeta/3969; Colin P.A. Jones, The LDP constitution, article by article: a preview of things to come?, 
JAPAN TIMES (July 2, 2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2013/07/02/issues/the-ldp-
constitution-a-preview-of-things-to-come/#.Vp-RNIf2bIV; Voices of Overseas Youth for Civic 
Engagement, Draft for the Amendment of the Constitution of Japan, VOYCE, http://www.voyce-
jpn.com/ldp-draft-constitution (contemplated new Articles 98 and 99). 
45 LDP Proposes Prioritizing Debate on Contingencies in Revising Constitution, MAINICHI (May 8, 
2015), http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150508p2a00m0na010000c.html.   
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the Diet may require the Cabinet to decide whether to hold such a session.46  
In times of national emergency, when the Diet has been dissolved, the 
Cabinet may call the Upper House back into emergency session to enact 
provisional measures that become permanent only if approved within 10 
days of the Lower House returning.47  The LDP’s contemplated proposal 
contains what James Madison characterized as the seeds of “tyranny,” by 
combining the legislative, judicial, and executive power in the hands of a 
small select group. 48  The Cabinet as specified in the proposal, requires only 
a bare majority of members be elected officials, and all members must be 
appointed by and serve at the Prime Minister’s pleasure.49 
The Diet can expand the definition of “emergency” beyond the 
already broad circumstances established in the LDP proposal.  Expansions 
could result from armed attacks, social disorder from internal insurrections 
or other reasons, or natural disasters.  Moreover, the LDP contemplated 
proposal, consistent with emergency amendments designed to increase the 
power of a ruling elite,50 contains few limits on actions of the “Emergency 
Cabinet.”51  Strikingly, none of the protections that modern democracies use 
to cabin an Emergency Clause are present in the LDP proposal.52  
 
46 KENPŌ art. 53 (“The Cabinet may determine to convoke extraordinary sessions of the Diet. When 
a quarter or more of the total members of either House makes the demand, the Cabinet must determine on 
such convocation.”) 
47 Id, at 54, para. 23 “When the House of Representatives is dissolved, the House of Councillors 
[sic] is closed at the same time. However, the Cabinet may in time of national emergency convoke the 
House of Councillors [sic] in emergency session. Measures taken at such session as mentioned in the 
proviso of the preceding paragraph shall be provisional and shall become null and void unless agreed to by 
the House of Representatives within a period of ten days after the opening of the next session of the Diet.” 
48  THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
49 KENPŌ art. 68, para. 23 “The Prime Minister shall appoint the Ministers of State. However, a 
majority of their number must be chosen from among the members of the Diet. The Prime Minister may 
remove the Ministers of State as he chooses.” 
50 Christian Bjørnskov & Stefan Voigt, The Determinants of Emergency Constitutions 1728, 31 
(Mar. 23, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2697144. 
51 See Voices of Overseas Youth for Civic Engagement, supra note 44; Jones, supra note 44.  
52  The contemplated clause does not do any of the following: separate the declaring authority from 
the executing authority (the Prime Minister declares an emergency and his handpicked Cabinet executes the 
emergency powers); require the legislative Branch immediately to be called into session to approve or 
reject the declaration, and remain in session to review future Cabinet Orders; list freedoms that are exempt 
from Executive limitations; provide judicial review of the declaration or actions taken there under. The 
contemplated clause also does not distinguish between emergencies and situations needed when the 
existence of the State is threatened (e.g., war launched against Japan), and those that may require short term 
immediate action, such as natural disasters.  It also does not define the reason why a Declaration is required 
(e.g., to uphold the democratic rights of the public), nor does it protect human rights or democracy.  See 
OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 4046, 5463 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2006). 
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Catastrophes, such as the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, could 
have been sufficient to set aside democratic rule.  Perhaps an oil embargo, 
such as the pre-Pacific War American Embargo53 or a suspension of oil 
supply from the Persian Gulf, which would endanger the public’s right to 
pursue happiness might also be sufficient.  Indeed, any action that might 
impede happiness, an incredibly broad category, would appear sufficient.54  
In these cases, the Constitution would not limit the Cabinet’s authority 
to enforce orders that are narrowly tailored to address the declared 
emergency.  Their authority would not be limited to employing the least 
restrictive effect on its citizens’ rights.  There is no prohibition against the 
Prime Minister declaring new emergencies as old emergencies expire.55  
During a State of Emergency, the public would be required to carry out the 
instructions of the State.56  While the LDP draft would require “respect” be 
given to fundamental human rights, “respect” is a state of mind, rather than a 
prohibition.  Government can respect freedom of speech, but nonetheless 
prohibit it in circumstances where it deems appropriate.  As such, the 
government can give respect by considering the effect of the emergency 
actions on citizens’ rights, but nonetheless, conclude that the Cabinet’s order 
and its limiting effect on the fundamental human rights is necessary.  In 
 
53 The United States was a major exporter of oil to Japan both before and after Japan’s invasion of 
China in 1937.  Having previously abrogated the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (1911), in July 1940 
United States passed the Export Control Act requiring licenses for shipments of critical war materials.  
Then the United States effectively embargoed the shipment of high octane aircraft fuel and other products 
important for Japan’s war effort.  In response, Japan was able to import low octane fuel and then raise the 
octane level to aviation quality.  In July 1941, in response to Japan’s occupation of southern French 
Indochina, the United States froze all Japanese assets in the United States and put in place a “hard 
embargo” against all oil shipments to Japan. KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR THE WAR PRESIDENT, 19401943 
262265 (2000); Oil – Oil and World Power, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NEW AMERICAN NATION, 
http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Oil-Oil-and-world-power.html; 5 AM. J. OF INT’L L. No. 2 
at 100106; W.H.M., Economic Warfare with Japan or a New Treaty?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Jan. 1940), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/69975/whm/economic-warfare-with-japan-or-a-new-treaty; U.S. 
Dep’t of State, Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 19311941, United States Government 
Printing Office (1943), Relations With Japan 19381940, 9798. 
54 Prime Minister Abe has suggested Japan could use mine sweepers as part of collective self defense 
if mines interrupted global oil supplies interfering with Japanese citizen pursuit of happiness. Collective 
defense right limited: Abe, JAPAN NEWS (July 14, 2014), http://the-japan-
news.com/news/article/0001423669. Compare Koichi Kido defense argument at the War Crimes Trial in 
Edward J. Miller, Bankrupting the Enemy (2007) 242. Abe’s comment echoing Japan’s prewar actions 
reflects a theory of entitlement. See FORREST E. MORGAN, COMPELLENCE AND STRATEGIC CULTURE OF 
IMPERIAL JAPAN, 174 (2003). 
55 Young Lawyer's Association for The Future of Freedom, supra note 13; Voices of Overseas Youth 
for Civic Engagement, supra note 44. 
56 Id. Proposed Article 99.3; see also, Noah Smith, Is Japan Asia’s Next Autocracy?, BLOOMBERG 
VIEW (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-02-20/japan-s-constitutional-change-
is-move-toward-autocracy. 
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short, rights must be respected by deliberating the effect of Cabinet action on 
the citizens’ rights, but that respect does not prevent “violation” of rights if 
deems such infringements as “necessary” or “reasonable.”57   
To restrict abuse of the emergency clause under the Meiji 
Constitution, Ito Hirobumi when drafting the Meiji Constitution58 cabined 
use of the emergency clause to situations where the Diet was not in session 
and subjected emergency actions taken to Diet review once the Diet returned 
into session.59  Under a constitution which placed power in an Emperor 
descended from the Sun Goddess, which did not provide for representative 
democracy,60 did not grant self-executing rights to the public, and made no 
provision for recalling the Diet into session to deal with an emergency, this 
may have made sense.  It is hardly a satisfactory solution for a democracy 
under a constitution that separates and cabins government power.61  Post-
emergency review by the legislature (provided in the Meiji Constitution) 
hardly compensates for the loss of human rights and freedoms  the LDP’s 
contemplated amendment would make permissible during that emergency 
period.  Actions taken under emergency cabinet orders would be 
constitutional, so neither the government nor government officials would be 
responsible for actions taken in derogation of people’s rights.  The 100-day 
period when an emergency declaration is in place before it requires 
extension by the Diet (or perhaps reordering by the Prime Minister) is a long 
period; much can happen to topple a democracy, destroy an opposition 
 
57 Abe Tells Upper House Committee ‘Emergency Provision’ Important in Constitutional Reform, 
MAINICHI (Nov. 11, 2015),  http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20151111/p2a/00m/0na/025000c; see also 
Conservative Group Behind Pro-Constitutional Amendment Petition Collecting, MAINICHI (May, 4, 2016),  
http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160504/p2a/00m/0na/011000c (noting that the support group for 
emergency clause amendment believes the clause will enable the setting aside of fundamental human 
rights). 
58 For a discussion of Ito’s views on the subject, see Colegrove, supra note 27, at 642, 657659. 
59 ITO, supra note 7, at 1619. 
60 KERBO MCKINSTRY, WHO RULES JAPAN: THE INNER CIRCLES OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
POWER 85 (1995).  The only representative body under the Meiji Constitution was the elected Lower House 
of the Diet, but at the time of adoption only some one point five percent of Japan’s forty million citizens 
had the right to vote.  In the run up to the Constitution, the Peace Preservation Law of 1887, which was 
even more restrictive of freedoms than the Press and Newspaper Laws adopted prior to the constitution and 
which had been instrumental in defeating the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement, was enacted.  In 
1925 a draconian iteration of the Peace Preservation Law was enacted as a counterweight to the Universal 
Male Suffrage Law of 1925, suppressing the rise of representative democracy. 
61 This is not to suggest that some expansion of executive powers could not take place during an 
emergency and/or that the judiciary might grant the executive greater authority to deal with the emergency. 
See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605 (2003); Mark 
Tushnet, Issues of Method in Analyzing the Policy Response to Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1581 
(2004). 
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movement, or punish enemies during such a period.  One of the main factors 
ending democracy in Rome was when the “Dictator,” acting under the 
emergency provisions of governance (which limited his term of office), 
remained in office.  More recently, Hitler rode to power on the back of the 
Weimar Republic’s Emergency Clause.62
Democracies rarely introduce emergency provisions into democratic 
constitutions by way of amendment63 and a majority of “emergency 
constitutions” require some actor in addition to a Head of State or Prime 
Minister to approve the declaration.64  The contemplated amendment calls 
for Diet (or at least House of Representatives) concurrence either before or 
after a declaration, allowing a declaration to be called without prior Diet 
approval and without setting at least a short time period for Diet action to 
accept or reject the declaration.  The amendment the LDP is considering 
fails to take into account the potential for legislative or executive abuse.65  
Giving the Diet authority to extend an emergency runs the risk that a 
political party might remain in power by simply extending so-called 
emergencies, thereby avoiding elections.  This is especially true in the 
Japanese situation where the Diet, like the Cabinet, is likely under the 
control of the declaring Prime Minister’s party, so there likely is a 
congruence of interest between the declaring Prime Minister and the Diet.  
The judiciary is intentionally excluded from review of the declaration or 
actions taken under emergency Cabinet orders.  
Of course, democracies are not immune from the impulse to take 
“emergency measures” that limit citizens’ rights in the face of an 
 
62 Marc De Wilde, Just Trust Us: A Short History of Emergency Powers and Constitutional Change, 
3 COMP. LEGAL HIST. 110 (2015). See JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 139178 (1991). See GOODMAN, supra note 17, at 2730, 492; GEORGE M. 
BECKMANN, THE MAKING OF THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION 33, 7880 (1957); GEORGE AKITA, FOUNDATIONS 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN MODERN JAPAN, 18681900, at 165166 (1967); Yoshiuki Noda, 
Comparative Jurisprudence in Japan: Its Past and Present, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 194, 196 
(Hideo Tanaka ed., 1976); Kenzo Takayanagi, A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese 
Law, in LAW IN JAPAN 5, 34 (Arthur Taylor Von Mehren ed., 1963), would fail to recognize the possible 
shortcomings of Emergency Powers in its former ally’s constitution. 
63 As early as 1610 in The Case of Proclamations (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 1352, Lord Coke held that the 
British King’s proclamation right did not extend to changing either common law or statute law.  See 
generally Bjørnskov & Voigt, supra note 50 (citing only two examples of democratic countries who 
adopted emergency provisions by amendment in footnote 3).  
64 See generally Bjørnskov & Voigt, supra note 50 (stating that 58% require action by either one or 
more Houses of the Legislature). 
65 See generally Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 631 (2006); De Wilde, supra note 62. 
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emergency.66  Ironically, Japan’s leaders, who roundly and correctly criticize 
the internment of Japanese Americans during the emergency of the Pacific 
War, appear poised to engrain emergency powers limiting rights and limiting 
separation of power.  The Supreme Court of the United States, however, 
recognized its failure a mere decade later when it reined in the assertion of 
Presidential power to seize steel mills to forestall a labor shutdown in order 
to continue manufacture of steel needed for armaments to continue the 
Korean War.67  In face of the so-called “war on terrorism,” the Court has 
continued to assert its role to review actions of the executive.68  
The need for such an emergency amendment is yet to be shown.  The 
Self Defense Force is frequently used under the current Constitution to assist 
the civilian population when typhoons, tsunami, earthquakes and other 
disasters occur in Japan.  Japan’s government, operating under the 1947 
Constitution issued much needed evacuation orders as well as instructions 
when the TEPCO nuclear power plant was disabled during the 2011 Great 
East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and the Fukushima Nuclear accident.  
Prime Minister Kan, acting under the Constitution, went to Fukushima to 
take a hands-on approach to the nuclear disaster. 69  
If the emergency power amendment was adopted, the current 
generation of LDP leaders would (in disregard of both their parents’ and 
grandparents’ arguments that the Meiji Constitution had been abused by the 
military) provide a means to set aside the 1947 Constitution’s democratizing 
 
66 See generally Vermeule, supra note 65 (citing WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: 
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998); CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS 
GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1948); Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the 
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673, 2679 (2005); Christina E. Wells & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, 
Foreword to Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Fear and Risk Perception in Times of Democratic Crisis, 69 
MO. L. REV. 897 (2004); John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
427 (2003)). 
67 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).  
68 See STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD 6588 (2015). It was not until 2011 that the 
Executive Branch acknowledged that documents such as the Ringle Report on Japanese Internment, 
NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND (Dec. 30, 1941), 
http://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/r/ringle-report-
on-japanese-internment.html, had not been made available to the Supreme Court when it was deciding the 
internment cases. David G. Savage, U.S. Official Cites Misconduct in Japanese American Internment 
Cases, L.A. TIMES (May 24, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/24/nation/la-na-japanese-
americans-20110525.   
69 See, e.g., RICHARD J. SAMUELS, 3.11: DISASTER AND CHANGE IN JAPAN 916 (2013). Yet he was 
criticized for such action – not on constitutional grounds but on grounds that he was “an amateur” and 
should leave handling of the disaster to the professional bureaucrats. Yuka Hayashi & Norihiko Shirouzu, 
Kan Cuts Out Bureaucrats, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 9, 2011), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487045870045762 44321680679708.   
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provisions such as elections, separation of powers, judicial review and 
citizens’ rights, thereby creating a constitutional path enabling a potential 
future generation of leaders with an autocratic bent to set aside the 
democratic ideals and the rights provisions of the Constitution.  For 
example, the emergency Article of the Meiji Constitution was abused in 
1928 when an emergency declaration was a subterfuge for the government’s 
inability to obtain Diet approval of an amendment to the Peace Preservation 
Laws that increased the penalties for “dangerous thoughts”.70  If adopted, a 
Prime Minister’s declared emergency might, for example, be used to 
criminalize speech opposing policies of the Prime Minister’s government or 
speech urging the Prime Minister to step down and allow for a new Lower 
House election. 
While closely cabined emergency executive powers to preserve 
democracy may make sense for countries with a historically strong rule of 
law/rights-based systems with democracy-protecting structures, Japan does 
not fall into such category.  Its overly deferential judiciary (which lacks 
support from the Diet and Cabinet)71 is a weak reed on which to rely.72  
Japan’s executive has become the supreme organ of the State, 
notwithstanding the Constitution.73  Its bureaucracy acts in extra-legal 
fashion with little judicial review and shows disdain for the rule of law; in 
the debate over “reinterpreting” Article 9 the powerful Cabinet Legislation 
Bureau (the bureaucratic organ designed to protect the Constitution from 
executive and legislative action inconsistent with the Constitution) took a 
 
70 See COLEGROVE, supra note 27, at 658659 to the effect that the events of 1928 disclosed that 
prewar Japan was not a democracy. 
71 The Court has only found a handful of laws unconstitutional and except for their voting rights 
decisions, none upholding a democratic state against Executive and Diet challenge. Even in voting rights 
the Court is yet to set aside a single election for a single Diet seat. Prime Minister Abe is reported to have 
considered rejecting a proposal for redistricting that would comply with the Court’s decisions and instead 
would put the proposal into effect only after 2020 – thereby excluding elections in which the LDP hopes to 
achieve their two-thirds majority in the Upper House enabling it to propose Constitutional amendment. See 
Abe may OK electoral system reform to reduce vote-value disparity after 2020 Census, MAINICHI (Feb. 27, 
2016), http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160227/p2a/ 00m/0na/013000c.  
72 The 2014 Lower House election that gave the LDP its two-thirds majority in that House was held 
under a condition of inequality – but no judicial relief was granted. See Top Court Questions 
Constitutionality of 2014 Election, MAINICHI (Nov. 26, 2015), 
http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20151125p2g00m0dm 056 000c.html. 
73 Virtually all laws adopted by the Diet are Cabinet offered Bills written by the Executive Branch. 
Gerald L. Curtis, The Government of Modern Japan: The Japanese Diet (Parliament), ASIAN TOPICS, 
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/at/jp_diet/govtjd03.html. The Judiciary itself acts to defeat separation of 
powers doctrine by appointing Judges to serve in Executive Agencies. Kazuko Tanaka, Country Paper for 
Japan, Organization and Management of Government Legal Services of Japan, ASIAN DEV. BANK, 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-document/71939/33069/ledge/far.pdf. 
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“no position” position.74  Emergency powers in the Japanese situation are 
both unnecessary and dangerous.75  
B.  Amending the Preamble, Enhancing the Position of the Emperor, 
Making the Family the Basic Unit of Society – Steps on the Road to 
Pre-War Kokutai 
i.  The contemplated Amendment to the Preamble and “Japanese 
Uniqueness” 
The LDP’s considered amendments for a new Preamble to the 
Constitution would emphasize Japan’s “uniqueness,”76 a concept tied to the 
notion of Kokutai and the descent of the gods in Japan,77 and whose 
uniqueness is itself “special.”  In Japanese myth, the gods descended on the 
islands of Japan, where Jimmu, a direct descendant of the Sun Goddess 
Amaterasu, moved from god to human as the first in an unbroken imperial 
line leading to the current Emperor.78  Under State Shinto, the Emperor was 
a living Kami; under the Japanese family system, he was the head of the 
Japanese house consisting of all Japanese people who, through their descent 
 
74 See, e.g., Cabinet Legislation Bureau has No Record of Constitution Reinterpretation 
Deliberations, MAINICHI (Sep. 28, 2015), http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150928p2a 
00m0na035000c.html; Cabinet Legislation Bureau Head Left No Record of Meeting About Constitutional 
Reinterpretation, MAINICHI (Feb. 15, 2016), 
http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160215/p2a/00m/0na/007000c. 
75 See Mark Fenwick, Emergency Powers and the Limits of Constitutionalism in Japan, in 
EMERGENCY POWERS IN ASIA: EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY 314, 314341 (Victor V. Ramraj & 
Arun K. Thiruvengadam eds., 2010). For lack of necessity see, e.g., Most Municipalities Hit by 2011 
Disasters See No Need for Emergency Clause in Constitution, MAINICHI (Apr. 30, 2016), 
http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160430/p2a/00m/0na /003000c. 
76 Young Lawyer's Association for the Future of Freedom, supra note 13; Voices of Overseas Youth 
for Civic Engagement, supra note 44; see generally CHRISTIAN G. WINKLER, THE QUEST FOR JAPAN’S NEW 
CONSTITUTION: AN ANALYSIS OF VISIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM PROPOSALS 19802009 (2011). 
See also REPETA, supra note 44. 
77 NOZOMU KAWAMURA, SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIETY OF JAPAN 154 (Routledge 2011); HANE & 
PEREZ, supra note 3, at 2425. 
78  MOTOORI NORINAGA, The True Tradition of the Sun Goddess, 2 SOURCES OF JAPANESE 
TRADITION 15–22 (Ryusaku Tsunoda et al. eds., 1964); ROBERT J. SMITH, ANCESTOR WORSHIP IN 
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 811 (1974); HANE & PEREZ, supra note 3, at 2425; JOHN S. BROWNLEE, 
JAPANESE HISTORIANS AND THE NATIONAL MYTHS, 16001945: THE AGE OF THE GODS AND EMPEROR 
JIMMU 47 (1997). A modern illustration of the dangers of an Emergency Clause, even in the face of an 
attempted Military Coup, is seen by the over reaction to the attempted coup in Turkey during the summer 
of 2016. See Ozan Varol, Turkey’s Reichstag Fire, WORLD POST, (July 22, 2016), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/turkeys-reichstag-fire_us_5791f215e4b0a1917a 6e71e3. 
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from lesser Kami had a mythical relationship to each other79 and to the 
Emperor, who was entitled to unquestioned obedience.80  Under pre-war 
Kokutai, Japan was one national family under the Emperor.81  
Differences between societies make each unique in the sense that they 
are different from each other.  Japan’s pre-war era uniqueness was of a 
special character;82 a code word whose meaning was superiority of the 
“Yamato race.”83  Ideas of Japanese superiority can be traced to early Japan 
 
79 The various clans making up the Japanese people were also considered descendants of Kami and 
related to the Sun Goddess (who was the Kami ancestor of the Imperial family). See Hugh H. Smythe, The 
Japanese Emperor System, 19 SOCIAL RESEARCH 485, 492 (1952). See BRIJ TANKHA, KITA IKKI AND THE 
MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN 17, 28 (Global Oriental 2006) (the tying of the prevailing prewar idea of 
Japanese uniqueness and kokutai to the “sacred” origin or “divinity” of Japan.) 
80 See, e.g., statement by Emperor Hirohito upon enthronement quoted in QUIGLEY, supra note 7, at 
7475. 
81 SMITH, supra note 78, at 2526; HAROLD J. WRAY, Changes and Continuity in Japanese Images 
of the Kokutai and Attitudes and Roles Toward the Outside World, A Content Analysis of Japanese 
Textbooks 1903-1945, at 1819, 316, 408, 411 (1971); Cecil Brett, The Priest-Emperor Concept in 
Japanese Political Thought, 23 INDIAN J. OF POL. SCIENCE 17, 2526 (1962); Mariko Asano Tamanoi, 
Japanese Nationalism and the Female Body: A Critical Reassessment of the Discourse of Social Reformers 
on Factory Women, in WOMEN AND CLASS IN JAPANESE HISTORY 275, 280 (Hitomi Tonomura et al. eds., 
1999). 
82 The Occupation’s Shinto Directive attacked this idea of uniqueness by forbidding the teaching of 
Japan’s alleged imperial, national or territorial superiority based on ancestry or divine descent. SUPREME 
COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, The Shinto Directive, (15 December 1945); see also JOSEPH M. 
KITAGAWA, RELIGION IN JAPANESE HISTORY 271 (1966). 
83 Race fueled the Pacific War. American discrimination against Asians had its origin in the 
Immigration Act of 1790 which limited nationalization to “white” people, see Ozawa v. United States, 260 
U.S. 178 (1922) and United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923), and culminated in the Japanese exclusion 
from the Pacific Coast and internment during the war. In 1889, the Supreme Court in Chae Chan Ping v. 
United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), upheld the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, laying the foundation for 
later rulings that upheld Alien Land Laws that effectively prohibited Japanese from acquiring land in 
Pacific Coast states. See Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 
(1923). The California Alien Land law was only held unconstitutional after the War had ended. See Oyama 
v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). For American prewar discrimination against Asians, see generally 
COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 2746, 
317322 (1982); Office of the Historian, Japanese-American Relations at the Turn of the Century, 1900-
1922, DEP’T OF STATE, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/japanese-relations. The exclusion of 
Japanese American’s from the West Coast and their imprisonment after Pearl Harbor, notwithstanding 
evidence that the West Coast Japanese were loyal to the United States, was a culminating act of such 
discrimination. See CURTIS B. MUNSON, JAPANESE ON THE WEST COAST (1941); History of the FBI World 
War II Period: Late 1930’s-1945, FBI HISTORY, https://www2.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/worldwar.htm; 
Ringle Report on Japanese Internment, supra note 70; RICHARD REEVES, INFAMY 3840, 4850, 5354 
(2015); Eric J. Sundquist, The Japanese American Internment: A Reappraisal, 57 AM. SCHOLAR 529, 541 
(1988); DAVIS, supra note 55, at 418429; GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT 6571 (2001). 
The opposition of the United States to Japan’s request for an Asian Equality Covenant in the Versailles 
Treaty fueled Japanese/American antagonism. WORLD WAR I ENCYCLOPEDIA 962, 15971598 (Spencer C. 
Tucker ed., 2005); PEARL HARBOR REEXAMINED: PROLOGUE TO THE PACIFIC WAR 7 (Hilary Conroy & 
Harry Wray eds., 1990); Shusuke Takahara, Wilsonian Idealism and Its Impact on Japan, ASIATIC SOC’Y 
OF JAPAN (Mar. 17, 2003), http://www.asjapan.org/ web.php/lectures/2003/03. American racism produced a 
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and especially the Tokugawa period.84  All of which raises the question 
whether “unique” in the LDP contemplated amendment has a similar 
racial/superior component.85  Uniqueness of Japan, its people, and its culture 
was a central feature of pre-war Kokutai under which sovereignty was in the 
Emperor who, as a descendant of the Sun Goddess,86 was both the Head of 
State Shinto and Head of State, with authority and power inherent to all 
heads of State.87 
One of the “unique” aspects of Kokutai was a rejection of 
individuality and reliance on Japan’s group-oriented society whose basic 
unit was not the individual, but the family group, the iye,88 itself a bulwark 
    
racial backlash in a Japan that considered itself a superior culture and society, making accommodation to 
American demands impossible. See generally JOHN W. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER 
IN THE PACIFIC WAR (1986). 
84 ELLWOOD & PILGRIM, supra note 28, at 4446. 
85 PETER N. DALE, THE MYTH OF JAPANESE UNIQUENESS 3235, 3940, 204205 (1986); JOHN W. 
DOWER, WAYS OF FORGETTING, WAYS OF REMEMBERING 3132, 203318 (2012); WRAY, supra note 81, 
at 1819, 408411.  
86 The Mythology of the Emperor system is linked to the Japanese creation myth and the Land of the 
Gods. The myth is consistent with the universal “hero myth.” For a discussion of the Japanese myth and the 
universal hero myth. See generally JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE HERO WITH A THOUSAND FACES 207216 
(1949); see also W. PETRIE WATSON, THE FUTURE OF JAPAN 1314 (1907). The Emperor as a living God 
can be traced to Hirohito's mythological relationship to Jimmu and Amaterasu. This mythical ancestry 
supported the rulers of the early Yamato Kingdom. FLOYD HIATT ROSS, SHINTO, THE WAY OF JAPAN 2530 
(1965); MICHIKO Y. AOKI, ANCIENT MYTHS AND EARLY HISTORY OF JAPAN (1974). 
87 Prior to adoption of the Meiji Constitution, the Emperor under his inherent authority declared the 
Restoration complete giving himself governing authority. Two months later the Emperor issued the Charter 
Oath made by the authority of his office, an office that had no definition except for the Restoration Edict he 
had issued 2 months earlier. Smythe, supra note 79, at 485, 488. During the early Meiji period the Home 
Ministry used its inherent authority, stemming from its duty to protect the public interest and public order, 
to censor and close down press organs it objected to. KASZA, supra note 29. Article 4 of the 1947 
Constitution (“The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are provided for in this 
Constitution and he shall not have powers related to government.”) would also be amended by dropping the 
word “only” opening the door to the Emperor performing acts of state that are not provided for by the 
Constitution – potentially unhinging his inherent authority from constitutional restraint. Voices of Overseas 
Youth for Civic Engagement, supra note 44. 
88 For a discussion of the historic roots and the basics of the Iye clan system from the Yamato 
Kingdom era until the post war period and the relationship of the family system to the Emperor as a Kami 
God, see Smythe, supra note 79, at 485, 488491. Iye was a clan based family with a Head of House to 
whom all House members owed loyalty.  It continued in a never ending stream through time. The House 
(family) was the basic unit of Japan from the 8th Century.  Although abolished in law by the Occupation 
and the Constitution of 1947, remnants of the Iye and the idea of the Iye remain in Japan through the 
Family Register system. For a discussion of the Iye, see CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2012). 
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of the Kokutai.89  The communal nature of Japanese society as one family 
under the Emperor was central to Kokutai.90  
The contemplated Preamble’s emphasis on uniqueness is related to the 
amendment that would make the Emperor the Head of State and other 
seemingly unrelated amendments such as the amendment to strike 
individuality from the Constitution and the amendment to make the family 
the basic unit of society.  Rejection of individuality (a trait which is seen as 
an unwelcome Western import) and reliance on the family group were 
unique aspects of Kokutai.91  Under Kokutai, Japanese sovereignty resided 
in the Emperor, not in the people.92  The Constitution’s rejection of the pre-
war Kokutai is reflected in the Preamble that states, “sovereign power 
resides with the people.”93  In addition to stressing Japan’s “uniqueness,” the 
new Preamble would delete this phrase and simply refer to “popular 
sovereignty.”  
History enables us to gain a better understanding of what the 
amendment would mean.  In the period of so-called Taisho Democracy, 
Japan refused to accede to the Kellogg Briand Pact (under which acceding 
nations renounced war) on behalf of the Japanese people, because to do so 
would denigrate the Emperor.94  Japan also sought to add as a condition to 
the unconditional surrender demanded by the Allies, that the prerogatives of 
the Emperor were not to be affected by surrender.95  The Allies declined but 
noted that the ultimate “form” of government was to be determined by the 
Japanese people.  To some in Japan’s government, this provided breathing 
room for Kokutai arguing that “form” of government dealt with 
 
89 HAROLD S. QUIGLEY & JOHN E. TURNER, THE NEW JAPAN: GOVERNMENT AND POLICIES 140 
(1956). 
90 See SMITH, supra note 78, at 256; WRAY, supra note 81, at 408 (the Education Department’s 
“Principles of Kokutai” stressed the unbroken line of Imperial descent from the Sun Goddess and the 
family nation following the Emperor’s will). See also DELMAR M. BROWN, NATIONALISM IN JAPAN 208 
(1955) (quoting the Principles of Kokutai). 
91 See ROSS, supra note 86, at 144–150 (defining the relationship of rejection of individuality with 
Kokutai and its relationship to the Pacific War); see also WRAY, supra note 81, at 408410; see also 
BROWN, supra note 90, at 105, 208209, 222225 (individuality was also rejected because it was 
inconsistent with an all-powerful State). 
92 The Emperor’s Charter Oath and speech on promulgation of the Meiji Constitution utilize the 
Emperor’s mythical lineage from Jimmu (and hence from the Sun Goddess) as the basis for Imperial 
sovereignty by noting that the Emperor’s right to sovereignty was inherited from his Imperial ancestors. 
See Colegrove, supra note 27, at 646 (quoting Professor Hozumi to the effect that Hirobumi Itō was trying 
to harmonize a government based on the Emperor’s lineage from the Gods with 19th Century 
constitutionalism). 
93  KENPŌ  pmbl. 
94 QUIGLEY, supra note 7, at 7072. 
95 Smythe, supra note 79. 
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administration and could be decided by the people while Kokutai was of a 
different nature and remained unaffected.96  The issue surfaced again when 
Japanese negotiators and translators responded to the Occupation’s draft 
Constitution by attempting to change the basis of the imperial position from 
“sovereign will of the people” to “supreme will”,97 all seeking to protect the 
Kokutai nature of the Emperor as the vessel of Japanese sovereignty.  
The Preamble under contemplation would reject the Constitution’s 
recognition of sovereignty of the people as the source of legitimate 
government and thus reject the ideal that government is responsible to the 
people.  Together with the amendments to make the family the basic unit of 
Japanese society, to remove individuality from the Constitution, and to make 
the Emperor the Head of State, the LDP could be well on the way to 
recreating the pre-war Kokutai. 
ii. Enhancing the position of the Emperor 
Under Kokutai, the Emperor was the head of the Japanese house98 
owed the respect and obedience from his subjects (members of the house) 
that the family head of house was owed by all family members.99  Schools 
taught State Shinto.  The Emperor’s Rescript on Education was seen as 
virtually sacred with its “morals” and “ethics” more powerful than religious 
writ.100  Reverence to the Emperor, the cult of Emperor worship and family 
fealty owed to the Emperor as the head of house was learned at an early 
age.101  Kimigayo (idealizing the Emperor’s reign and rule) became the 
national anthem in 1888.102  The State became an extension of the Emperor 
through the concept of Kokutai, which tied the Japanese people to the State 
 
96 HELLEGERS, supra note 38. 
97 KOSEKI SHOOICHI, supra note 37, at 112113, 117. 
98 Cf. QUIGLEY, supra note 7, at 74. 
99 See Smythe, supra note 79, at 488 (analogizing the Emperor-subject relationship to that of a parent 
and child); BURUMA, supra note 17, at 5557; see also Miyazaki Fumiko, The Formation of Emperor 
Worship in the New Religions: The Case of Fujidō, 17 JAPANESE J. RELIGIOUS STUDS. 281, 309 (1990); 
WRAY, supra note 81, at 45, 1819. 
100 W.G. BEASLEY, JAPANESE IMPERIALISM, 18941945 35 (1987); HANE & PEREZ, supra note 3, at 
136. 
101 See SMITH, supra note 78, at 2627; see also Smythe, supra note 79, at 487 n.6 (the Ministry of 
Education’s official explanation of Kokutai (The Fundamental Principles of the National Structure) was 
taught in public schools). 
102 See LARGE, supra note 18, at 2930; Peter Cave, The Inescapability of Politics? Nationalism, 
Democratization and Social Order, in EDUCATION AS A POLITICAL TOOL IN ASIA 52 n.14 (Marie Lall & 
Edward Vickers eds., 2009). 
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and their very special relationship to the Emperor, to each other, to 
Amaterasu, and the gods.103  
The 1947 Constitution does not give the Emperor any governmental 
position—he is simply the Emperor.  He was intentionally not given the 
Head of State title104 and was to be a symbol without power,105 which is 
underscored by the current Article 3 that limits the Emperor to performing 
acts of state that have been subjected to the advice of and approval by the 
Cabinet.106  The LDP contemplates removal of the current Article 3 and 
unhinging imperial acts from Cabinet superiority (approval).  The 1947 
Constitution gives the Emperor specific functions to perform, all are 
ceremonial, carrying out government decisions in which the Emperor has 
played no role.  The LDP would make the Emperor the Head of State 
without providing what authority the Head of State would possess except for 
the fact that imperial acts need not be limited by advice and concurrence of 
the Cabinet.107  
The position of Head of State implicates the historic, cultural, and 
Kokutai role of the Emperor, especially as the change to the Preamble would 
bring to the fore the “uniqueness” of Japan that was central to Kokutai and 
the Emperor’s ancestry.  In its initial response indicating willingness to 
accept the Potsdam Declaration, Japan added one condition, retention of the 
Emperor's prerogatives.108  This might have meant the retention of the 
 
103 See LARGE, supra note 18, at 30 (Kokutai which unites Japan and its people—the land and the 
descendants of the Gods—with the Emperor in whom sovereignty lies, is inconsistent with democracy in 
which the State’s power is limited by the rights of the people, who hold sovereignty); see also BROWN, 
supra note 90, at 208209.  The Occupation attacked Kokutai by insisting that the Constitution recognize 
the people’s sovereignty, by rejecting the Imperial Rescript on Education and issuing a directive on 
“Abolition of Governmental Sponsorship, Support, Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of State 
Shinto” that removed government from participation in and/or support of Shinto affairs. See STUART D.B. 
PICKEN, SOURCEBOOK IN SHINTO: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 113117 (2004). Japanese Ministry of Education 
officials fought back, supporting the Rescript as ethical and moral teaching.  See TSUNODA ET AL., supra 
note 29, at 277288; see also ROSS, supra note 86, at 147150. A new Fundamental Law on Education was 
adopted in 1945 and in 1948 the Rescript was withdrawn from public schools. WILLIAM P. WOODARD, THE 
ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 19451952 AND JAPANESE RELIGIONS 164168 (1972). 
104 KENPŌ, art. 4. See also Kades, supra note 33, at 223; JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT 367
369 (1999) (General MacArthur recognized the Emperor as being at the head of the State but would not 
give the Emperor such title). 
105 NAKAMURA MASANORI, THE JAPANESE MONARCHY: AMBASSADOR GREW AND THE MAKING OF 
THE ‘SYMBOL’ EMPEROR SYSTEM 9097 (Herbert P. Bix et. al trans., M.E. Sharpe Inc. 1992) (1989). 
106 KENPŌ, art 3. 
107 Jones, supra note 44. 
108 QUIGLEY & TURNER, supra note 89, at 5. 
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Emperor as Head of State, and his Kokutai character, the contemplated 
amendment may be a means of returning to the initial Japanese response.  
The amendment would enable conservatives to argue that because the 
Emperor is Head of State as he was in Meiji Japan, together with the 
“uniqueness” of Japan that was the essence of the Kokutai (this uniqueness 
would now be recognized in the amended Preamble), and the dropping of 
Preamble language placing sovereignty in the people of Japan, the Emperor 
has the Kokutai status he held in the pre-war era.  This argument would be 
strengthened by the considered amendment to Article 99 that would exempt 
the Emperor (Head of State) from the obligation to support the 
Constitution.109 
The position of Head of State implies governmental powers typically 
exercised by a Head of State and implies the authority to create subordinate 
organs to assist the Head of State.  The Emperor’s current ability to perform 
specific duties derives not from his title but from the fact that the 
Constitution gives the Emperor the authority to perform specific and limited 
ceremonial duties.  He appoints the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
because the Constitution says he shall do so, not because he is Head of State.  
The reason for such appointment authority is to elevate the position of the 
Chief Justice and highlight the rule of law, not to enhance the Emperor. 
Granting the Emperor the Head of State mantle would give him a 
government position allowing government ministers to seek his view on 
matters, as well as give him the authority that inheres in the position of Head 
of State, an authority that is subject to interpretation.  In some countries 
where there is both a Prime Minister and a Head of State, the Head of State 
may have broad powers, including the ability to determine when a new 
election must be held after a government is discharged.110  To those who 
would argue that the Constitution would still restrain the Emperor’s powers, 
one need look no further than the dual character of the Emperor under the 
 
109  The amendment to recognize and require respect for the flag and national anthem, symbols of the 
State like the Emperor, could affect the authority of an Emperor Head of State and might require the public 
to respect the Emperor. See Jones, supra note 44; Japan’s Constitution: Back to the Future, THE 
ECONOMIST (June 1, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21578712-shinzo-abes-plan-rewrite-
japans-constitution-running-trouble-back-future. 
110 See GRUNDGSETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], arts. 5461 (Ger.); see also Christopher Sweeney, Australia 
in turmoil as Whiltam is fired, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 1975), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/1975/nov/12/australia.fromthearchive (Australian Government Crisis - 
the Governor-General, as representative of the Queen (Head of State), dismissed the government and 
ordered a new election); NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF AUSTRALIA, THE DISMISSAL, 1975 – FACT SHEET 240 
(2016), http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/fact-sheets/fs240.aspx. 
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Meiji Constitution,111 it could be argued that a dual character would exist, 
under which his powers as Emperor would be limited by Chapter I while his 
powers as Head of State would not be so limited.112  Head of State, Emperor 
Hirohito, may not have exercised power, but he had great authority; without 
his agreement the war could not have been prosecuted.  When he told a 
divided Cabinet to accept the Potsdam Declaration, he ended the war.113  As 
is true generally, but more so in regard to Japanese law, it is the law as 
interpreted rather than the written law that is controlling.114  
The change would be substantive: it would provide a juridical hook on 
which to hang a “Cabinet Declaration” overturning 70 years of interpretation 
of Chapter I of the Constitution115 or allow the Cabinet Legislation Bureau to 
take “no position” on the interpretation issue ala its actions involving the 
Cabinet Declaration concerning Article 9.116  Once given a government 
position not cabined by the Constitution, the perennial LDP majority could 
provide the Emperor significant powers by legislation giving such powers to 
the Head of State.  In short, the amendment could lead to replacement of the 
symbolic Emperor with a Kokutai status Emperor. 
The Constitution would make this replacement relatively easy because 
the Constitution does not use the English language title Emperor, but rather 
uses the Japanese term “Tenno,” which has a “heavenly” characteristic.117  A 
 
111 See Colegrove, supra note 27, at 64653 (dual character is not only related to the imperial 
sovereignty vs. constitutional monarch, but also the Emperor’s religious character via his ancestry 
descending from the Sun Goddess and his role under the Constitution). 
112 The LDP website describing the changes to the Emperor provisions states, “This chapter 
prescribes the Emperor as the Head of State, the symbol of the State and as a unifying entity for the people” 
giving the Emperor a triple character, Head of State, symbol of State, and unifying entity. See LDP 
announces a new draft Constitution for Japan, LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN (May 7, 2012), 
https://www.jimin.jp/english/news/117099.html.   
113 KYOKO INOUE, supra note 8, at 164182. 
114  See Yoichi Higuchi, The Constitution and the Emperor System: Is Revisionism Alive?, 53 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 52 (1990) (viewing the 1947 Constitution as changing the Emperor from a sovereign 
Emperor to a symbolic Emperor); id. at 5657 (noting that in practice the government has taken steps to 
showcase him as Head of State as part of a drive to reinstitute Kokutai in practice if not in law). See also 
GOODMAN, supra note 88 (for the view that in Japanese law, “What You See May Not Be What You Get”). 
115 See Part 2 subsection v.; see also infra note 244, Jeff Kingston, Opinion, Abe’s constitutional 
putsch and U.S. security cooperation, JAPAN TIMES (July 12, 2014), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/07/12/commentary/abes-constitutional-putsch-u-s-security-
cooperation/#.U-FqiSx0wdU. 
116 See Legislation bureau head admits not recording constitutional reinterpretation discussions, 
MAINICHI (Jan. 22, 2016), http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160122/p2a/00m/0na/019000c; Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau’s job undermined by gov’t intervention, MAINICHI (Sep. 28, 2015), 
http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20150928/p2a/00m/0na/028000c.   
117 See “Tenno” COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, (2012), 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/tenno; Wikipedia, 
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“heavenly Emperor” Head of State uniquely descended from the Sun 
Goddess and Jimmu would represent something akin to Emperors under the 
Meiji Constitution.118  The contemplated amendment to Article 20 that 
would remove the prohibition of any religious organization exercising 
political authority while permitting the State or organs of the State (for 
example an Emperor Head of State) to engage in religious activities that are 
traditional or considered matters of social etiquette119 would enhance the 
status of and powers of a Tenno “heavenly Emperor” Head of State 
performing services that are the interface between the Emperor descended 
from the gods and the gods themselves, and would support a return to the 
pre-war Kokutai.120 
While Emperor Hirohito in his “humanity declaration” rejected the 
idea that he was a god, he did not reject his lineage tracing back to the Sun 
Goddess, nor his inheritance of sovereignty over the land and people of 
Japan from his imperial ancestors ranging back to the Sun Goddess, the 
foundations of his pre-war Kokutai status.121  In Shinto there is no single god 
in the monotheistic sense of the word, although god-like characters such as 
the Sun Goddess are part of Shinto.  Shinto Kami, while they partake of 
deification, are not God in the Old or New Testament or Koran exclusive-
God sense.122  Kami are both gods who rule the earth, sky, and underworld, 
but are also spirits that can adhere in everything in the natural world, in 
    
https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emperor_of_Japan; Jeff Taliaferro, The Emperor of Japan, HERALDICA 
(Jan. 7, 2001), http://www.heraldica.org/topics/royalty/japan.htm. 
118 See Brett, supra note 81.  
119 See Jones, supra note 44. Article 89 would also be amended to permit the use of public funds to 
support religious associations and institutions where the use is limited to customary matters or matters of 
social etiquette. Social etiquette is subject to broad interpretation and could include allowing government 
entities to make contributions to selected shrines (such as the Yasukuni Shrine) to celebrate holidays, 
celebrate festivals, honoring Japanese war dead, etc. The considered amendment does not require that all 
Shinto shrines be treated equally, potentially overturning the Supreme Court of Japan decision holding that 
a contribution to a specific shrine to honor the war dead was in violation of the Constitution because it 
constituted governmental favor of a specific shrine. See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997 (gyo tsu) 
no. 156, 51 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1673 (Japan). The amendment would also 
appear to legitimize in the basic law the Court’s decisions that enshrinement of Koreans who fought for 
Japan during the war is acceptable even in the face of family objection. Instead of relying on the non-
governmental nature of Yasukuni the Court could rely on the “custom” of enshrinement of the war dead, or 
enshrinement as social etiquette. The prohibition of government officials visiting Yasukuni in their official 
capacity would be fully wiped off the books and with it the need for politicians to divide their personal 
from official self. See QUIGLEY & TURNER, supra note 89, at 190. 
120 BEN-AMI SHILLONY, ENIGMA OF THE EMPERORS: SACRED SUBSERVIENCE IN JAPANESE HISTORY 
203216 (2005). 
121 TANKHA, supra note 79, at 38–43. 
122 See ROSS, supra note 86, at 31–33. 
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ancestors, in people, in beautiful scenery.123  The Sun Goddess is the 
principle heavenly Kami of the Japanese myth and ancestor to, but only to, 
the imperial family.124  While not a God in the “monotheistic” sense, 
Hirohito’s supposed ancestry going back to the Sun Goddess gave him a 
different status from other beings and in this sense reflected his divinity.125  
Although some Japanese people thought of him as a god in the “one God” 
traditions, others rejected that view.126  It was only his supposed status as a 
“one God”-type god that Hirohito renounced.127 
The Emperor did not acknowledge that the idea of a living Emperor 
god was a relatively new phenomenon which the Meiji revolutionaries 
adopted, building on theocratic ideas of the late Tokugawa period to 
strengthen their hold on power,128 or that the myth of descent from the Sun 
Goddess was created to support the ancient Yamato rulers' hold on power.129  
Refusal to renounce his descent from the Sun Goddess was not accidental 
nor was his failure to acknowledge that such descent was a myth, creating 
ambiguity allowing some conservatives, nationalists and revisionists to 
worship his descendant to this day.130  Nor did the Emperor renounce the 
idea that the Japanese people themselves were progeny of the Kami, an idea 
inherent in State Shinto’s placement of the Emperor as head of the Japanese 
family, carried forward by the Rescript on Education and the curriculum in 
Meiji Constitution-era schools,131 and at the heart of the idea that the 
Japanese are descendants of the gods132 whose imperial line reached back 
into prehistory making them unique and superior.133 
Shinto and the Emperor’s unbroken lineage back to the Sun Goddess 
continue to play a role in modern Japan, including a role in the ascension of 
 
123 See, e.g., KITAGAWA, supra note 82, at 11–19; CHARLES J. DUNN, EVERYDAY LIFE IN 
TRADITIONAL JAPAN 124–126 (1969); MORGAN, supra note 54, at 38–39, 41; CAMPBELL, supra note 86, at 
212; Kami, BBC (Sept. 04, 2009), http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/shinto/beliefs/kami_1.shtml. 
124 SMITH, supra note 78, at 10–11. 
125 Smythe, supra note 79, at 488–491. 
126 See Colegrove, supra note 27, at 642, 645–648; 2 SOURCES OF JAPANESE TRADITION: 1600 TO 200, 
PART 2: 1868 TO 2000, at 122–125 (Wm. Theodore de Bary et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006). 
127 See, e.g., Brett, supra note 81, at 25–26 (discussing an instance in which a dual character to the 
Emperor comes into play as he can renounce being a “One God” God while retaining his other character as 
a descendant for the Sun Goddess, and hence a Divine heritage). 
128 See, e.g., BURUMA, supra note 17, at 55–57; KITAGAWA, supra note 82, at 175–176, 185, 201–
203; ROSS, supra note 86, at 141–143. 
129 Brett, supra note 81, at 19–20, 24. 
130 DAIKICHI IROKAWA, THE AGE OF HIROHITO: IN SEARCH OF MODERN JAPAN 126–128 (Mikiso 
Hane & John K. Urda trans., 1995). 
131 HELEN HARDACRE, SHINTO AND THE STATE, 18681988, at 40 (John F. Wilson ed., 1989). 
132 See Smythe, supra note 79, at 492. 
133 See, e.g., DOWER, supra note 85, at 216–217, 221; MORGAN, supra note 54, at 38–39, 60–65. 
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a new Emperor, making it easy to transition from a symbolic Emperor to a 
heavenly Emperor with implied powers inherent in a Head of State 
unshackled from consent of the Cabinet for his acts and who has no 
constitutional obligation to respect the Constitution.  Article 24 of the 
Imperial Household Law (the law that governs accession, succession, and 
various aspects of the imperial family’s life) requires a new Emperor to go 
through an accession ceremony, the precise nature of which is undefined.  
The Shinto ceremony known as Daijosai is part of the enthronement.  
Various explanations of the function and what occurs during this ceremony 
have been put forward.  The Imperial Household Agency explains on its 
website only that it involves the offering of new rice to the acceding 
Emperor’s ancestors.134  
Mystery surrounds the fundamental question of whether by 
performing this ceremony—which takes place in part in the dead of night 
within a temple—the Emperor, notwithstanding Emperor Hirohito’s 
renunciation of any claim to being a living god, becomes a Kami spirit or 
god.135  That mystery and the incomplete nature of the Emperor’s declaration 
have left room for those who wish to return the Emperor to his pre-war 
status to argue that nothing has changed.136  The Daijosai, full of mystery,137 
was tied to the Kami-like status of the Emperor in the Meiji Constitution and 
earlier eras.138  It is tied to the Emperor’s claimed lineage back to the dawn 
of Japan, to the Sun Goddess, to the numerous Emperors before him.139  
 
134 Enthronement and Ceremonies, THE IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD AGENCY, 
http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-about/seido/sokui.html. 
135 See ELLWOOD & PILGRIM, supra note 28, at 22 (explaining linkage between the Daijosai and 
divine emperorship); SHILLONY, supra note 120, at 258–259 (discussing Emperor Akihito’s Daijosai); 
ROBERT HARVEY, AMERICAN SHOGUN: MACARTHUR, HIROHITO, AND THE AMERICAN DUEL WITH JAPAN, 
454–456 (2006). 
136 David Kenley, History and Memory: The Role of War Memorials and Museums in China and 
Japan, 14 EDUCATION ABOUT ASIA 5, 10–11 (2009); Jonathan Watts, Japan’s revisionists turn emperor 
into a god once more, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2002), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/aug/21/japan.jonathanwatts. 
137 See generally THE CULTURE OF SECRECY IN JAPANESE RELIGION (Bernhard Scheid & Mark 
Teeuwen eds., 2006) (discussing the significance of mystery in Japanese religion). 
138 Manabu Waida, Buddhism and National Community in Early Japan, in TRANSITIONS AND 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS 221, 229–231 (Frank B. Reynolds & Theodore M. 
Ludwig, eds., 1980). 
139 See, e.g., JOHN S. BROWNLEE, JAPANESE HISTORIANS AND THE NATIONAL MYTHS 1600–1945: THE 
AGE OF THE GODS AND EMPEROR JIMMU 4–7 (1994) (discussing how the creation myth and the Emperor’s 
direct lineage to the Sun Goddess was generally accepted by Japanese society from as early as the Yamato 
Kingdom of the 7th or 8th Century through the Pacific War and still holds sway in some segments of the 
population—it was the linchpin for the Emperor’s special status and vessel of Japanese sovereignty). 
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Theories are that it transforms the Emperor into a living Kami,140 that he is 
responsible for the Japanese people, even that he gathers into himself the 
spirit of previous Emperors going back to Jimmu.141  Theories abound and 
can be created to fit one’s belief or agenda.   
While the Supreme Court allowed the expenditure of government 
funds for the Daijosai when Emperor Akihito was enthroned, it did so on the 
fiction that the ceremony was secular and was required to complete the 
formalities of accession.142  Adoption of the amendment allowing 
government involvement in traditional ceremonies would permit recognition 
of Daijosai as a Shinto ceremony because it is traditional, and thereby opens 
the door to recognizing the religious significance of the ceremony—a door 
currently closed because of the Constitution.143  Once opened, the path 
towards recognition of the Emperor as a living Kami would be made 
respectable and constitutional, supporting the Emperor’s pre-war Kokutai 
status.  
The history of Japan is filled with situations in which the Emperor 
was used by a faction to overturn or attempt to overturn a government – the 
Meiji Restoration being the most recent.  If the Tenno were to become the 
Head of State with the ability to perform traditional religious functions, it 
could dramatically change the relationship of the people and government to 
the Emperor.144  A Tenno Head of State performing Shinto ceremonies in 
Shinto shrines as an intermediary between the people and their ancestors 
provides a handy tool for mischief.145  It should not be forgotten that the 
 
140 Katsutoshi Takami, From Devine Legitimacy to the Myth of Consensus, The Emperor System and 
Popular Sovereignty, in FIVE DECADES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN JAPANESE SOCIETY 9, 10–11 (Yoichi 
Higuchi ed., 2001). 
141 STUART D. B. PICKEN, ESSENTIALS OF SHINTO: AN ANALYTICAL GUIDE TO PRINCIPAL TEACHINGS 
82–87 (Charles Wei-hsun Fu ed., 1994). 
142 QUIGLEY, supra note 8, at 62, 78 (describing how Emperor Akihito’s accession ceremony 
spawned legal challenges because government money was unconstitutionally used for a religious 
ceremony. Courts concluded the ceremony was essentially secular and required to install the new Emperor. 
The Cabinet declared it secular— reminiscent of the pre-war government’s declaration that Shinto was not 
a religion and Shinto shrines not religious; SHILLONY, supra note 120, at 258 (describing how the accession 
ceremony justified use of government money because it was a private ceremony of the imperial family to 
uphold the status). See Takamori Akinori, Daigosai, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SHINTO, (Jan. 29, 2007), 
http://eos.kokugakuin.ac.jp/modules/xwords/entry.php?entryID=883 (explaining how daijosai is, of course, 
recognized as an ancient Shinto ceremony); see also Steven R. Weisman, Akihito Performs His Solitary 
Rite, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/23/world/akihito-performs-his-
solitary-rite.html.   
143 JERROLD M. PACKARD, SONS OF HEAVEN: A PORTRAIT OF THE JAPANESE MONARCHY 18–21 
(1987). 
144 Brett, supra note 81, at 25–28. 
145 See Kades, supra note 33, at 215, 234 (discussing importance of making the Emperor’s role 
unambiguous).  
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Meiji oligarchs enhanced the status of and Kami-like nature of the Meiji 
Emperor (enshrined in Tokyo’s Meiji Shrine) and then used the young 
Emperor Meiji to carry out their authoritarian government policies.  A future 
Japanese leader (perhaps yet unborn) with authoritarian tendencies could 
similarly use a heavenly Emperor Head of State with authority to perform 
Shinto religious ceremonies because they are part of etiquette or are 
considered traditional to displace Japan’s fragile democracy with an 
authoritarian regime.  
iii.  Removing Individuality and the Guarantee of Fundamental Human 
Rights from the Constitution’s Text 
Article 13 of the Constitution requires that all of the people (kokumin, 
i.e., Japanese people) be treated as individuals and that legislation focus on 
their rights to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness moderated by public 
welfare considerations.  However, reminiscent of the Meiji State’s emphasis 
on group compliance and public order, select amendments proposed by the 
LDP intend to strike treating people as individuals to treat them instead as a 
“people.”146  In addition, the LDP proposes a new heading and additional 
text for Article 12, emphasizing the public’s responsibility not to abuse 
constitutional rights, and to recognize that freedom and rights are balanced 
by duties and obligations.147  The LDP also suggests removing Article 97 
 
146 See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, 1970 (A) no. 1310, SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ 
[SAIBANSHO WEB], http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=38 (Japan) (explaining the 
significance of the Constitutional recognition of individuality was commented on by Justice Tanaka in his 
concurring opinion wherein the Court struck down enhanced punishment for patricide: “The clause that 
‘every person of this country should be respected as an individual’ . . . declares a fundamental idea of 
regarding the respect of individual dignity as an origin of all the values, and that the guarantee of the 
equality of every individual is the fundamental principle and the basis of democracy … every unreasonable 
discrimination ascertained in the light of the fundamental principle of democracy to respect and to 
guarantee individual dignity and individual values, should be considered invalid as violating of the spirit of 
this provision.” His view has not been applied by the Court in later decisions. 
147 Young Lawyer’s Association for the Future of Freedom, supra note 13. See also Voices of 
Overseas Youth for Civic Engagement, supra note 44; Kyodo News, Komeito may opt against right to 
good environment amendment in Constitution, JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 23, 2015),  
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/03/23/national/politics-diplomacy/komeito-may-opt-against-right-
to-good-environment-amendment-in-
constitution/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=komeito-may-opt-against-right-to-good-
environment-amendment-in-constitution#.VUa-tLl0zIV (describing how lawmakers are considering new 
Constitutional obligations on the part of the State to protect the environment which are likely to be 
dropped); European Commission Press Release IP/14/324, The Commission, Environment: Commission 
takes Greece to court over failure to protect iconic species (Mar. 28, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-14-324_en.htm (stating that the European Commission in suing a European State to compel it to 
meet its obligation to protect the environment); David R. Boyd,  The Constitutional Right to a Healthy 
Environment, ENVIRONMENT MAGAZINE (July-August 2012)  
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(which currently recognizes that fundamental human rights are “fruits of the 
age-old struggle of man to be free”).  This would be an effort to emphasize 
public order over the rights of the people, and to acknowledge that the rights 
granted by the Emperor to his subjects in the Meiji Constitution were a gift 
from the Emperor, and that the grant of rights in the LDP-amended 
Constitution is also a grant from the Emperor, not fundamental rights 
applicable to all humanity.148  While the LDP’s considered amendments 
would acknowledge that “respect” be given to fundamental human rights 
elsewhere in the Constitution, respect for rights is not equivalent to a 
guarantee of the rights in the Constitution; a right may be respected but 
nonetheless restricted or violated by legislation.149   
The idea that each person, each individual, has fundamental human 
rights was a basic idea of the Enlightenment period that informed the writers 
of the Constitution of the United States, but was rejected by Ito Hirobumi 
when drafting the Meiji Constitution.  The Meiji oligarchs, pre-war Japanese 
leaders, and schools rejected individualism,150 and used the Rescript on 
Education, The Way of the Subject, as well as the Peace Preservation Law to 
stifle individualistic thought.151  The Ministry of Education’s definitive 
explanation of Kokutai noted that the Japanese were unique and superior 
partly because they rejected individualism.152  Notwithstanding the 1947 
Constitution’s emphasis on individual rights, Japanese schools continue their 
    
http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/2012/July-August%202012/constitutional-
rights-full.html; The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, Draft for the Amendment of the Constitution of 
Japan: in contrast to the current Constitution (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.voyce-jpn.com/ldp-draft-
constitution (proposing consideration be given to the rights of crime victims (likely permitting crime 
victim's rights to balance and diminish rights of the accused and the presumption of innocence) and to 
protect citizens abroad (opening the door to demands that the SDF be used to free Japanese hostages or 
other Japanese citizens who either the government, or a particularly strong interest group, might conclude 
are wrongfully held in a foreign State. Government inaction might be seen as violating their Constitutional 
duty leading to the same type of “sincere belief” excuse for actions—including assassinations—that 
brought down civil government in the lead up to the Pacific War). 
148 Jones, supra note 44. 
149 It can be argued that rights were “respected” by the Meiji Constitution through the Constitution’s 
reference to them. Nonetheless the right was subject to legislation. 
150 BROWN, supra note 90, at 104105. 
151 See Sharon H. Nolte, National Morality and Universal Ethics, Onishi Hajime and the Imperial 
Rescript on Education, 38 MONUMENTA NIPPONICA 283 (1983); BROWN, supra note 90, at 222225; 
Mitchell, supra note 26, at 317, 319, 322, 323, 343; ROSS, supra note 86, at 143. The denigration of 
individualism may be traced to the Tokugawa status system as the “group” one belonged to was the class 
one was assigned upon birth. HANE & PEREZ, supra note 3, at 21. See TSUNODA ET AL., supra note 29, at 
139140, for the text of the Rescript on Education. 
152 DOWER, supra note 85, at 221223; WRAY, supra note 81, at 408410. 
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pre-war role of teaching children how to conform as part of their group153 
and modern Japan remains dominated by a “consensus” or group model.154  
Japan’s modern leaders share their predecessor’s rejection of 
individuality.155  Individualism is deemed inconsistent with the “uniqueness” 
that adheres to the Japanese as a group and compels individuals to 
subordinate their individuality to the unique Japanese group, culture, values 
and thought process.156  This group emphasis is moderated in the public 
sphere by the Constitution’s grant of individual rights that allows individuals 
to swim against the group tide and, for example, speak out in opposition to 
the prevailing majority opinion or sue the State (or their employer or third 
parties) for violating the individual’s rights.  But, there is a contradiction of 
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153 Robert Aspinall, Violence in Schools: Tensions Between the “Individual” and the “Group” in the 
Japanese Educational System, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 235, 236240 (Jeff Kingston 
ed., 2014). Although the Occupation failed in its attempt to make individuality a core value in Japan (See 
MASUDA, supra note 36, at 217218) there is evidence that some educators at the university level recognize 
that the effort to downplay individuality is part of an objective to turn a rights based constitution into a 
public order based constitution. See, e.g., Takuya Asakura, University chancellor: Embrace individualism, 
be wary of constitutional revision, in ASAHI SHIMBUN (May 1, 2015), 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201505010008. 
154 See, e.g., Anne Imamura, Family Culture, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MODERN JAPANESE 
CULTURE  76 et seq. (Yoshio Sugimoto ed., 2009); INOUE, supra note 8, at 231235; PATRICK SMITH, 
JAPAN: A REINTERPRETATION 11220 (1997). Many times “rights” are seen from a group rather than 
individual perspective. Carl F. Goodman, The Evolving Law of Document Production in Japanese Civil 
Procedure: Context, Culture, and Community, 33 BROOK. J. OF INT’L LAW 125 (2007); EDWIN O. 
REISCHAUER & MARIUS B. JANSEN, THE JAPANESE TODAY: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 128 (1998); Charles 
R. Fenwick, Culture, Philosophy and Crime: The Japanese Experience, 9 INT’L J. OF COMP. & APPLIED 
CRIM. JUST. 67, 7172 (1985); Haim Weinberg, The Culture of the Group and Groups from Different 
Cultures, 36 GROUP ANALYSIS 253, 260 (2003); YASUMASA KURODA, THE CORE OF JAPANESE 
DEMOCRACY 149 (2005). 
155 Japan’s judiciary has rejected individuality. In cases involving surrogate birth or in vitro 
fertilization, the Supreme Court focuses not on the rights of the surrogate, egg or sperm donors, genetic 
parents or the children conceived and/or born as a consequence but rather on whether society approves of 
the procedure as shown by statute allowing it. See SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 4, 2006, 2004 (Ju) 
1748, 60 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHU] 7 (holding that posthumously conceived child not 
registered in deceased husband’s family register, although the sperm had been harvested specifically for the 
purpose of in vitro fertilization – interests of the child are subordinated to “public interest”); SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 23, 2007, 2006 (Kyo) 47, 61 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHU] 2 
(holding that children conceived with egg and sperm of married Japanese couple but carried by a surrogate 
in the United States was not allowed to be registered in genetic father’s family register notwithstanding that 
the surrogate claimed no rights, the genetic parents wanted registration, U.S. law allowed the process, and a 
U.S. court certified that the Japanese parents were the child’s natural parents, and such registration was in 
the best interests of the child). Cf. SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 10, 2013, 2013 (Kyo) 5, 67 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHU] 9 (holding that a child born to a couple, one of whom suffered 
from gender identity disorder and had a sex change but could not have been the genetic father of the child, 
could be added to father’s family registry because the law allowed for change of sex of the GID parent, 
indicating societal approval). 
156 DALE, supra note 85, at 2023. 
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sorts – societal norms in Japan are group oriented while the law and 
constitution’s orientation is individual focused in order to protect each 
individual’s rights.  The amendments would turn the Constitution’s attention 
(and hence the law’s attention) away from individual rights and towards the 
obligations that human beings owe to society, community, and ultimately, 
the Japanese State157 consistent with The Way of the Subject (required 
reading for Japanese troops)158 and the Fundamentals of Our National Polity 
that spelt out the nature of the Japanese Kokutai and rejected individuality.159  
Article 12 of the 1947 Constitution already specifies that freedom and 
rights come with responsibility and obligations, a provision that is 
substantive, and not just “window dressing.”  Article 12 reads: 
 
Article 12. The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by 
this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor 
of the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these 
freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for 
utilizing them for the public welfare.160 
 
In the Tokyo Metropolitan Public Safety case, the Supreme Court 
upheld a Tokyo ordinance that required the permission of the Metropolitan 
Public Safety Commission before a mass demonstration could be held in 
Tokyo—whether on public ways or private property. 161  The Court therefore 
recognized that freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 21 of the 1947 
Constitution is “eternal and inviolate,” and is a fundamental human right 
that, like all other human rights granted by the Constitution, is subject to 
Article 12’s public welfare and abuse limitation.  The Court concluded that 
because the ordinance did not “unreasonably” abridge freedom of expression 
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157 VOX POPULI: The constitutional debate over 'human beings' vs. 'individuals', ASAHI SHIMBUN, 
(Feb. 24, 2014) http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/vox/AJ201402240045. 
158 DOWER, supra note 85, at 26. 
159 See Tsunoda et al., supra note 29, at 278288, for excerpts from Fundamentals of our National 
Polity (Introduction). 
160 KENPŌ art. 12.   
161 The Ordinance reads, in part: “Article 1. A permission of the Metropolitan Public Safety 
Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Public Safety Commission) is required in order to hold a 
meeting or mass parade on the road or other public places, or engage in mass demonstration irrespective of 
places. However, cases that come under any item of the following are excepted from the provision of the 
present article. 1. Picnics or educational trips of students and pupils, physical education meetings and sports 
meetings. 2. Established functions such as the ceremonies of coming of age, marriage, funeral, and 
ancestral worship.” SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO [Sup.Ct.] July 20, 1960, 1960 (A) 112, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
HANERISHŪ [SAIBANSHO WEB] http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=15 (quoting ordinance). 
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or exceed what was required for public welfare, it was constitutional.162  
Because Article 12 already permits “reasonable” limitations on fundamental 
human rights, it is proper to ask: “what does the amendment to Article 12 
emphasizing the public’s responsibility not to abuse their rights and to 
recognize that freedom and rights are balanced by duties and obligations 
seek to achieve?”  Clearly it is to emphasize and make clear that actions that 
disturb the public interest and public order constitute an abuse of and thus 
are outside the ambit and protection of constitutional rights, thereby 
reinforcing Article 12’s restriction on fundamental human rights so that in a 
clash between the obligation not to abuse constitutional rights and an 
individual’s constitutional right, the public order and public interest should 
prevail.   
The Supreme Court of Japan has applied a balancing test under which 
rights granted to individuals under the Constitution (in the case at issue the 
rights of a criminal suspect), must be balanced against the constitutional 
right of the State (the prosecutor) to perform its functions, and in the 
process, has denied criminal suspects many of their constitutional rights.  
The consequence has been to interpret the Criminal Procedure Code 
provisions as defining the constitutional rights granted to suspects and 
accused persons.163  By placing rights of the citizens on the same 
constitutional plane as citizens’ obligations to the public order and public 
good,164 the Constitution would now require that each right contained in the 
Constitution be balanced against a public order or public good limitation, 
 
162 Id. At times the SDF force (and other governing bodies) may question and obtain personal 
information (political affiliation, employment, etc.) from demonstrators. A High Court held in early 2016 
that such activities violated the privacy of demonstrators, but allowed only approximately $1,000 in 
damages to a single demonstrator and refused to enjoin such activities in the future. High court upholds 
damages payment over SDF intelligence activities, MAINICHI (Feb. 02, 2016) 
http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160202/p2g/00m/0dm/052000c.   
163 In a 1999 case the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court permitted the prosecutor to question a 
suspect even after the suspect requested to meet with counsel. The Court recognized that the Constitution 
gave the suspect the right to meet but because the right to punish those who commit crimes is presumed by 
the Constitution, this State function has constitutional recognition placing it on a par with the right to 
consult with counsel. Accordingly, the Diet may strike a “reasonable” balance between these two 
constitutionally recognized rights. The accused right is not given priority over the State's right to punish the 
guilty. The State's right (per Code of Criminal Procedure) to question a suspect outside the presence of 
counsel for twenty-three days is a reasonable balance. Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct.] Mar. 24, 1999, 1993 (O) 
1189, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO HANREISHŪ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=433.   
164 It can be argued that public order and public good includes “social order” which would appear to 
contemplate an obligation not to disturb accepted social order. See Repeta, supra note 44. 
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which either was or was not defined in a legislative pronouncement.165  The 
effect of the amendments would codify the existing prioritization of societal 
rights over individual rights in the criminal law arena and extend that 
prioritization to other areas of the law thereby limiting constitutional rights 
to legislative definitions of public interest and public order, resurrecting the 
Matsumoto draft of the Constitution and the Meiji Constitution’s limitation  
of rights to only such rights as are granted by the government (i.e., rights set 
out in the Constitution and not taken away or modified by legislation are 
granted, whereas those taken away or limited by legislation are denied as 
long as the legislation is “reasonable”).  Legislation would define the public 
order and would define what rights the people had by defining when the 
exercise of a right was inconsistent with the constitutional duty to conform 
to the public good and public order.  Worse yet, lack of legislation defining 
the meaning of constitutional rights would leave open the question of 
whether the exercise of the right conformed to the Constitution; this would 
allow the executive and accommodating bureaucratic judiciary to decide if 
the individual made a mistake in understanding what was or was not in the 
interest of the public order, as was the case for Professor Minobe in the 
1920s and 1930s.166  The desired constitutional change is reminiscent of the 
1934 law that increased the penalties for acts inconsistent with the public 
order, which caused a dissenting Diet member to complain that “public 
order” was subject to very broad interpretation, suggesting the amendment 
would be extremely dangerous.167 
 
165 The Court has even balanced the free speech rights of citizens who object to government policy to 
the “privacy” rights of citizens who do not want handouts dropped in their publicly available mailboxes - 
the privacy right has prevailed. See GOODMAN, supra note 88, at 160161. On the other hand, high volume 
broadcasts of right wing speeches from moving vehicles are permitted as free speech. Daniel Dolan, 
Cultural  Noise: Amplified Sound, Freedom of Expression and Privacy Rights in Japan, 2 INT’L J. COMM. 
662, 664 (2008). 
166 In 2007, the Court upheld a criminal conviction finding that an ordinance designed to discourage 
motorcycle gangs by prohibiting them from demonstrating or congregating in public while wearing 
clothing that shows the name of the motorcycle group or was “peculiar” was too broadly worded. However, 
since arrests could only be made after a warning from a city official, the conviction was affirmed. The court 
found that the warning was sufficient to disclose that the action was in violation of the ordinance, 
regardless of the ordinance’s vague and overbroad wording. Two Justices dissented. To the majority it 
seemed clear that the defendant, once warned, should have known that the ordinance applied to him. The 
free speech issue was not discussed, apparently because it was clear that the ordinance was acceptable 
under Article 12, and as one Justice put it, the feeling of the public had to be considered (i.e., public order 
and public welfare). Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct.] Sep. 18, 2007, 2005 (A) 1819 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
HANREISHŪ [SAIBANSHO WEB] 1, http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=911 (Horigomi, J., 
concurring). 
167 See KASZA, supra note 29, at 127128. 
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Contemplated Article 12 would be a rejection of what today is 
virtually a universal view among true democracies; namely, a significant 
purpose of a written constitution is to prevent government abuse by 
guaranteeing its peoples’ rights against the government, not to place 
obligations, including the obligation to conform to the government’s 
definition of public interest and public order, on the public.  It would 
represent a new and troubling form of Japanese uniqueness.168  
Instead of Article 97’s recognition of fundamental human rights, 
people would be treated as “people” (or “humans”) rather than individuals.  
But the LDP amendments do not define what rights adhere to being a person 
or human.169  By implication they are not what are generally understood to 
be “fundamental human rights,” such as those promulgated by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (which Japan has signed), because the term 
“fundamental human rights” is being specifically removed from the 
Constitution.170  An LDP pamphlet makes clear that Western ideas of natural 
rights should be rejected.171  
Removal of Article 97 may have meaning by negative implication.  It 
is not all people who are entitled to the rights set out in the Constitution, but 
only the citizens of Japan (kokumin).  Thus, the citizens of Japan are granted 
the rights under the Constitution to be treated as humans, but how are non-
citizens to be treated?  If a constitutional provision to treat Japanese people 
as humans or people is required (rather than recognition of the fundamental 
nature of human rights that apply to all humans) then by negative 
implication non-Japanese people, who are not granted the right to be treated 
like people, lack the right granted to Japanese citizens to be treated like 
people.  Aside from the paternalism reflected by such language, if applied to 
bears this would mean that Japanese bears shall be treated as bears – North 
American black bears, Russian bears, or polar bears would, by negative 
implication have no right to be treated as bears.  The residents of Japan who 
 
168 The change could also remove the Constitution’s function as supreme law, as it would only be 
supreme law if the legislature did not pass a conflicting or limiting statute. 
169 The phase “fundamental human rights” has real meaning. Through such documents as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights those fundamental rights are defined. See JOSEPH WRONKA, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 227 (rev. ed. 1998); Onuma Yasuake, Towards 
a More Inclusive Human Rights Regime, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 110114 
(Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell, eds., 1999). 
170 It is reported that the intention is to rid the Japanese Constitution of Western enlightenment human 
rights theories. Smith, supra note 56. 
171 Lawrence Repeta, Limiting Fundamental Rights Protection in Japan: The Role of the Supreme 
Court, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 49 (2013). 
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are not citizens would be outside the frame of fundamental human rights and 
thus would have no constitutional right to be treated by the Japanese 
government as people or humans. Could they be treated as somewhat less 
human than their Japanese neighbors?  Would Japan be obligated to treat 
people outside Japan as human?172  Could all non-Japanese wherever located 
be treated as something less human than Japanese?173  
 Such a provision would be particularly harmful to “Special 
Permanent Residents” of Japan, defined as Korean residents at the time of 
surrender who were not repatriated to Korea and lost their Japanese 
citizenship when Japan recognized and signed the San Francisco Accords 
treaty with South Korea (and their progeny who as a consequence are not 
children of Japanese citizens and therefore are not Japanese citizens as a 
consequence of birth in Japan).174  Such negative implication arising from 
restricting the right to be treated as a person or human to Japanese citizens is 
supported by the proposed change to the Preamble that would refer to the 
special quality of the Japanese people as a “unique” society, and is 
reminiscent of pre-war commentary describing western countries who 
floundered in individualism as inferior to Japan’s unique society.175  It would 
turn the Constitution’s role of reversing the pre-war era’s beliefs of racial 
superiority on their head.  This would support a return of the pre-war 
Kokutai, which favored the family State under the sovereign Emperor, as 
head of the Japanese house, entitled to obedience from other house 
members, as well as spiritual leader and Kami under State Shinto.  Here, 
Japanese uniqueness (and superiority) was based on their Emperor’s and his 
ancestor’s direct descent from the Sun Goddess and the people’s relationship 
to other Kami and to their Emperor.176  
 
172 See HIDETOSHI HASHIMOTO, THE PROSPECTS FOR A REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM IN 
EAST ASIA 5564 (2004), for the view that fundamental human rights are universal and a list of treaties 
recognizing human rights. 
173 Article 97 reads: “The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the people of 
Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have survived the many exacting tests for 
durability and are conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to be held for all time inviolate.” 
NIKHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 97. 
174 Saikō Saibansho [Sup.Ct.] Apr. 5, 1961, 1955 (O) 890, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO HANREISHŪ 
[SAIBANSHO WEB] 1, http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=17 (holding that a Japanese woman 
married in 1935 to a man of Korean ancestry—who was a Japanese resident in Japan, a citizen of pre-war 
Japan, and entered into his Family Register—was denied Japanese citizenship as a result of South 
Korea/Japan Peace Treaty and could not return to her father’s Japanese Family Register and lost her 
Japanese citizenship). 
175 See, e.g., JANSEN, supra note 29, at 642; DOWER, supra note 85, at 20305, 211, 21617. 
176 See ROSS, supra note 86, at 144150; WRAY, supra note 81, at 408410, for the relationship of 
rejection of individuality with Kokuta. 
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iv.  Speech, Association and Other Activities Contrary to Public Order 
Would Not Be Constitutionally Protected if the LDP Amendments 
were Adopted  
As noted above, the Supreme Court of Japan has already held that 
Article 12 moderates Article 21’s grant of freedom of assembly, association, 
speech, press, other forms of expression, and the contemplated amendments 
seek to strengthen such moderation by emphasizing the people’s obligation 
not to abuse any constitutional rights by defining abuse as actions that are 
inconsistent with public interest and the public order.  To drive home the 
point that speech and association rights are limited to speech and association 
activities that are in conformity to the public interest and public order (and 
hence not an abuse of the speech and association right) an additional 
paragraph would be added to Article 21 making clear that activities designed 
to change the public order are outside constitutional protection.  Placement 
of this new paragraph in the freedom of assembly and association Article 
makes clear that its purpose is not simply to restrict organizing or 
demonstrating for the purpose of changing the public order but also directly 
attacks speech, association, press reporting, commentary, and other 
expressive forms that support change in (and hence are activities that are not 
in conformity with) the existing definition of public order.177 
The fear of free speech and association mirrors concerns of the early 
Meiji and pre-war periods in which freedom of speech was severely 
restricted by legislation that made it a crime to attempt to change the 
political system.  Speaking out for a different interpretation of Kokutai was 
unlawful.  Ideas that challenged the government’s view of public order were 
silenced before they could lead to public debate.178  Consistent with Ito 
Hirobumi’s understanding of the Meiji Constitution that he drafted, the 
contemplated addition would draw a distinction between thought (which 
would be free), and activities (such as speaking or otherwise publicizing the 
thought) that would be restricted to matters consistent with upholding 
 
177 See Repeta, supra note 44. 
178 ELISE K. TIPTON, THE JAPANESE POLICE STATE – THE TOKKO IN INTERWAR JAPAN 6265, 132 
(1990); Rare 1941 ‘Thought Police’ Training Document Discovered, MAINICHI (Aug. 2, 2015), 
http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150802p2a00m0na005000c.html. 
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“public order.”179  Public order would be defined by the government as it 
was in the 1930s.180  
Speech and press freedoms in Japan are already significantly 
limited.181  Mass demonstrations are subject to police approval under local 
ordinances, although approval is usually (but not always) given because of 
concern that failure to do so would violate the Constitution.182  That could 
change if association for purposes of changing the public order were 
excluded from constitutional protection.  Moreover, the paragraph the LDP 
would add to Article 12 would open the door to more restrictive regulation, 
as the legislature or bureaucrats expanded the definition of public order 
narrowing the space for free speech and expression.  The 1947 Constitution 
has not been interpreted to prohibit severe restrictions on campaign activities 
and endorsements of candidates by ordinary citizens and the press during the 
all-important election period immediately prior to voting.183  These 
restrictions are specifically designed to limit activities that could affect the 
results of the election, and thus, a newspaper editorializing or providing 
information during the election period as to why it believes candidate A is 
preferable to candidate B would be violating the law.184  Presently, 
individual candidates in single seat districts are restricted as to how much 
 
179 HIROBUMI ITO, supra note 7, at 6162. 
180 In 1934, a Diet member objecting to proposed legislation increasing punishment for acts 
inconsistent with public order noted that the change was dangerous because of the broad meaning that 
could be given to “public order.” The law was enacted.  See KASZA, supra note 29, at 127128. 
181 See generally, GOODMAN, supra note 88, at 155179. Japan has steadily fallen in rankings of press 
freedom so that it is no longer in the top sixty of the 180 countries ranked by Reporters Without Borders 
(Japan was ranked at seventy-two in 2016). See Ayako Mie, Japan’s government defends against multiple 
accusations of stifling press freedom, JAPAN 
TIMES, (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/21/national/japans-government-
defends-multiple-accusations-stifling-press-freedom/#.VxlhDojD_nM. 
182 See generally, Himeji city gov't apologizes for halting anti-
Abe gathering, MAINICHI (OCT. 1, 2015), 
http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20151001p2a00m0na004000c.html. 
183 See, e.g., Masahiro Usaki, Restrictions on Political Campaigns in Japan, 53 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 133 (1990); Alex Klein, The Puzzle of Ineffective Election Campaigning in Japan, 12 JAPANESE J. 
POL. SCI. 57, 59 (2011); Matthew J. Wilson, E-Elections: Time for Japan to Embrace Online Campaigning, 
2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4 (2011), http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/wilson-e-elections.pdf; see also, Matthew J. 
Wilson, Essay, E-Elections: Law in Asia & Online Political Activities, 12 WYO. L. REV. 237 (2012).  
184 In a recent Tokyo Governor’s race, the LDP candidate supported the LDP's position that nuclear 
power plants should be restarted while the opposition candidate (former Prime Minister Hosakawa) ran on 
a non-nuclear platform. A NHK news commentator resigned when the government owned station advised 
him that he could not comment on questions concerning nuclear power as that could affect the election. See 
Martin Fackler, 
Japan’s Public Broadcaster Faces Accusations of Shift to the Right, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2014), http://ww
w.nytimes.com/2014/02/01/world/asia/japans-public-broadcaster-faces-accusations-of-shift-to-the-
right.html. 
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TV time they can buy.  Party candidates running in both the single seat and 
proportional representative contests can benefit from the party’s ability to set 
forth policy positions that inure to their benefit as single seat district 
candidates.  This benefit to party candidates has been upheld by the judiciary 
on the grounds that they support a “level playing field” in elections 
notwithstanding the restrictions that actually favor party designated 
candidates over independent candidates.185  
The inhibiting effect of campaign speech restrictions during the 
election period is demonstrated by the infamous “Tsubaki affair.”  Tsubaki 
was forced to resign and a media executive apologized before the Diet 
because the station had expressed anti-LDP political views during the 1993 
election period (the election that brought into power the first non-LDP 
government since 1955).186  To ensure that news media did not similarly 
disparage the LDP or its candidates, the LDP in the run up to the 2014 
Lower House election wrote to the media reminding them of their duty to 
remain neutral in the campaign.187  In early 2016, an Internal Affairs and 
Communication Minister reminded the press that she could remove them 
from the air if they failed to report news in an unbiased manner or programs 
were not consistent with the public interest.188  Media outlets that own TV 
and/or radio stations that do not remain neutral must be concerned about 
government action when their licenses come up for renewal (generally every 
 
185 The Court’s decision was based on the importance of political parties to Japan’s election system.  
See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 23, 2011, 2010 (Gyo-Tsu) 207, 65 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ], http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1097. 
186 See LISBETH CLAUSEN, GLOBAL NEWS PRODUCTION 118120 (2003); ELLIS S. KRAUSS, 
BROADCASTING POLITICS IN JAPAN: NHK AND TELEVISION NEWS 236
237 (2000); NTV head bemoans pressure over LDP 
questioning, MAINICHI (Apr. 30, 2015), http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150428p2a00
m0na005000c.html. 
187 See LDP letter to broadcasters urges neutral poll campaign reporting, draws criticism, JAPAN 
TIMES (Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/11/28/national/ldp-letter-broadcasters-
urges-neutral-poll-campaign-reporting-draws-criticism/#.VHh6Vbl0zIW. 
188 See Tomohiro Osaki, Sanae Takaichi warns that government can shut down broadcasters it feels 
are biased, JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/09/national/politics-
diplomacy/minister-warns-that-government-can-shut-down-broadcasters-it-feels-are-
biased/#.Vrp_eYf2bIX; See also Opposition slams Cabinet minister's comment on possibility of taking 
broadcasters off air, MAINICHI (Feb. 10, 2016), 
http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160210/p2a/00m/0na/016000c; Editorial, Gov’t should not threaten 
autonomy of broadcasters, MAINICHI (Feb. 10, 2016), http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160210/p2a/00m
/0na/017000c; Communications ministry defends minister's remarks about taking broadcasters off air, 
MAINICHI (Feb. 13, 2016), http://mainichi.jp/english/and articles/20160213/p2a/00m/0na/009000c. 
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five years).189  It is reported that the head of the government-owned 
broadcaster, NHK, has instructed reporters to hew to the government line.190  
Japan now ranks sixty-one out of the 180 countries ranked by Reporters 
Without Borders for press freedom191 and in 2016, was criticized by the UN 
Special Rapporteur for lack of press freedom.192 
Self-censorship by the media, (whereby the media restricts its 
reporting activities to matter that comports with government policy) a staple 
of pre-war Japan, continues under Press Club membership and club “ethical 
rules”193 that have standardized and eroded objective reporting while 
highlighting the government's view and policies and limiting news critical of 
the government.194  The Press Club system, a carry forward from the Press 
Clubs of pre-war Japan, serve to enforce “self-censorship.”  The 
neutrality/fairness doctrine may have contributed to the LDP’s success in the 
2016 Upper House election as media outlets avoided discussion of issues 
affecting the election leaving voters unaware of the significance of granting 
the LDP (together with its allies favoring “constitution revisions”) a two-
thirds majority in the Upper House.195  Press Clubs are financially supported 
by the government body they are covering, reliant on their government 
 
189 See Gov't intervention into TV programs raises question: Can autonomy be kept?, MAINICHI (Feb. 
8, 2016), http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160208/p2a/00m/0na/012000c. 
190 See Tomohiro Osaki, NHK chairman's order to follow government line on Kyushu nuclear 
reactors sparks outcry, JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 27, 2016), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/27/national/nhk-chairmans-order-follow-government-line-
kyushu-nuclear-reactors-sparks-outcry/#.VyUW14jD_nM. 
191 See Ayako Mie, supra note 183; Toko Sekiguchi, Japan Slips in Press Freedom Ranking, WALL 
ST. J.: JAPAN REAL TIME (Feb. 13, 2015 5:40 PM JST), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2015/02/13/japan-slips-in-press-freedom-rankings/. 
192 See Yuri Kagemaya, UN rights expert sees threats to press independence in Japan, AP: THE BIG 
STORY (Apr. 19, 2016 2:46 AM EDT), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/d4ce117bf8484129a0280f78b5dc3b88/un-rights-expert-sees-threats-press-
independence-japan. 
193 See LOUIS D. HAYES, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE POLITICS 125−127 (5th ed. 2009) for the role 
of Press Clubs in limiting reporting in Japan. Among the ethical standards adopted by Press Clubs are 
requirements for freedom and responsibility, wherein freedom is moderated by public interest. See The 
Canon of Journalism, PRESSNET: NIHON SHINBUN KYOKAI (adopted June 21, 2000), 
http://www.pressnet.or.jp/english/about/canon/.  (“However, member newspapers must be duly aware of 
their heavy responsibility and be constantly mindful not to impair public interests”), accuracy and fairness, 
as well as decency and moderation, which includes “member newspapers … should at all times exercise 
moderation and good sense” terms that can be used to limit hard hitting expose reporting and can require 
neutrality on issues; Kisha Club Guidelines, PRESSNET: NIHON SHINBUN KYOKAI (revised Mar. 9, 2006), 
http://www.pressnet.or.jp/english/about/guideline/; see also LAURIE ANNE FREEMAN, CLOSING THE SHOP: 
INFORMATION CARTELS AND JAPAN’S MASS MEDIA (2000) (ebook); GOODMAN, supra note 88, at 165166. 
194 See WILLIAM DE LANGE, A HISTORY OF JAPANESE JOURNALISM 181192 (1998); FREEMAN, supra 
note 195. 
195 See TV stations claim they considered fairness in lack of election coverage, MAINICHI (July 19, 
2016),  http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160719/p2a/00m/0na/018000c. 
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sources for information, and their members do not buck the agency line for 
fear of being cut out of future press conferences or information.196  Reliance 
on information received at Press Club briefings is a defense to libel litigation 
while reliance on reports emanating from a reputable but independent news 
agency is not.197  There is little substantive investigative reporting in Japan 
because the Press Club’s hand-fed news is free from challenge in litigation 
and therefore enables news outlets to retain their favored status as Press 
Club members.198  Assuming adoption of the amendment to the free speech 
Article, the critical question for Japanese news outlets would be whether 
reporting of embarrassing events or commentary critical of government 
policy, positions, or leaders, would be constitutionally protected, or whether 
such reporting and editorializing could be considered contrary to the public 
interest or public order.  If reporting is outside public interest or order it 
lacks the protection of Article 12’s free speech right.  While such reporting 
may be considered acceptable today, at a future date could be considered 
contrary to public interest or public order, as was the case with Professor 
Minobe.  The clearly ambiguous terms “public interest" and “public order” 
likely would result in even more self-censorship than currently exists.199  In 
the long term, these restrictions could even be extended to permit the 
government to censor books, much like in the pre-war era when the 
publications ordinance permitted the Home Ministry to censor books on the 
basis that they disturbed public order or corrupted morals.200  
The limits on speech, press, and association that Japan’s government 
already imposes are moderated by the 1947 Constitution’s speech, press, and 
 
196 See generally, ADAM GAMBLE & TAKESATO WATANABE, A PUBLIC BETRAYED: AN INSIDE LOOK 
AT JAPANESE MEDIA ATROCITIES AND THEIR WARNINGS TO THE WEST 4566 (2004); see also FREEDOM IN 
THE WORLD 2006: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 369 (Aili Piano, Arch 
Puddington & Mark E. Rosenberg eds., 2006) (describing Japan’s Press Club System as an “obstacle” to 
press freedom in Japan). 
197 See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 29, 2002, 1995 (O) 1421, 56 Saikō Saibansho minji hanreishū 
[Minshū] 185. 
198 See, e.g., William Nester, Japan's Recruit Scandal: Government and Business for Sale, 12 THIRD 
WORLD QUARTERLY 91, 9697 (Apr., 1990). Self-censorship has become so ubiquitous in Japan that the 
European Union has formally urged Japan to abandon the Press Club system. See Jonathan Watts, EU acts 
to free Japanese media, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2002), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/29/worlddispatch.pressandpublishing.   
199 See David McNeill, Japan’s contemporary media, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 
64, 6473 (Jeff Kingston ed., 2014); Linda Sieg, Journalists In Japan Say There Is Growing Pressure To 
Self-Censor, REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/24/japanese-media-self-
censo_n_6741558.html. 
200 See, e.g., Emily Anderson, Tamura Naoomi's The Japanese Bride: Christianity, Nationalism, and 
Family in Meiji Japan, 34 JAPANESE J. RELIGIOUS STUD. 203, 215 (2007). 
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association clauses.  The new language sought would remove the moderating 
influence of the constitutional free speech right by only guaranteeing speech, 
press, and association rights to matter in the public interest or consistent with 
public order.  Current government efforts to control information affect 
Japanese textbooks as the Ministry of Education has a dominating position 
concerning which textbooks are used and what they may say.201  The 
Ministry claims that it acts to assure “historic fact” but its view of historic 
fact is frequently contested both domestically202 and internationally.203  A 
2015 survey concluded that only five percent of Japanese respondents knew 
a great deal about Japan's twentieth century wars.204  Japan’s history of 
 
201 The Occupations efforts to move textbook decisions from the national to the local level was not 
successful. See Masayuki Uchino, The Struggle for Educational Freedom, in FIVE DECADES OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN JAPANESE SOCIETY 115, 117118 (Yoichi Higuchi ed., 2001); see also 
CHRISTOPHER BARNARD, LANGUAGE, IDEOLOGY, AND JAPANESE HISTORY TEXTBOOKS 1012 (2003);  
YOSHIKO NOZAKI, WAR MEMORY, NATIONALISM AND EDUCATION IN POSTWAR JAPAN, 19452007: THE 
JAPANESE HISTORY TEXTBOOK CONTROVERSY AND IENAGA SABURO’S COURT CHALLENGES 1325 (2008) 
(ebook); JAMES L. MCCLAIN, JAPAN: A MODERN HISTORY 592593 (2002); Editorial, Dark facts in Japan's 
history all the more important to keep in schoolbooks, ASAHI SHIMBUN 
(2015), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201501220036; Hane & Perez, supra note 3, at  448
449. 
202 Okinawans objected and protested when the Ministry of Education sought to delete from 
textbooks references to the Military’s role in civilian suicides during the Battle of Okinawa. The Ministry 
backed down. See Isabel Reynolds, Okinawans urge textbook "truth" on WW2 suicides, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 
2007), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/10/03/uk-japan-okinawa-suicide-idUKT1253320071003; 
Norimitsu Onishi, Japan texts note army's role in suicides, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Dec. 27, 2007), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-12-27/news/0712260467_1_suicides-textbooks-okinawa. 
203 See Alexander Martin, U.S. Publisher Rebuffs Japan on ‘Comfort Women’ Revision ‘Scholars 
Aligned Behind Historical Fact’ of Forced Prostitution, McGraw-Hill Education Says, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 
15, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-publisher-rejects-japan-over-textbook-on-comfort-women-
1421299438; Justin McCurry, Japan urges US publisher to remove comfort women from textbooks, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/15/japan-urges-us-publisher-
delete-references-comfort-women; Hajimu Takeda, Ministry contacts foreign correspondent about source 
in ‘comfort women’ article, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Apr. 28, 2015), 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201504280084.   
204 See, e.g., Yomiuri Shimbun, Poll: 81% regard Japan as ‘peace-loving nation’, JAPAN NEWS (Feb. 
25, 2015), http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0001958156; Hiroshi Mitani, Writing History Text Books 
in Japan, in HISTORY TEXTBOOKS AND THE WARS IN ASIA: DIVIDED MEMORIES 193, 201202 (Gi-Wook 
Shin & Daniel C. Sneider, eds., 2011) (ebook); Mark Driscoll, Kobayashi Noshinori is Dead: Imperial 
War/Sick Liberal Peace/Neoliberal Class War, in 4 MECHADEMIA: WAR TIME 290, 299300 (Frenchy 
Lunning ed., 2009) (ebook); Linda Sieg, Okinawa furious at Japan's war suicide revision, REUTERS (June 
22, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/06/22/us-japan-okinawa-suicides-idUST29903020070622; 
Norimitsu Onishi, 
Japan’s Textbooks Reflect Revised History, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 1, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/200
7/04/01/world/asia/01japan.html?_r=0; Texts to restore Army Okinawa Mass Suicide Role, JAPAN TIMES (O
ct. 19, 2007), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2007/10/19/national/texts-to-restore-army-okinawa-mass-
suicide-role/#.VZq34rnbLIV. 
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dealing with reporters who contest the government’s view205 and its efforts 
to suppress and hide inconvenient historical facts (such as its continued 
denial of the terms of a side agreement with the United States concerning 
Okinawa—even after the United States had declassified and made the 
agreement public), as well as  its increased use of State Secrets laws to place 
government documents out of reach, casts a dark shadow on what could be 
censored in the name of public order.206  Even the Constitutional 
Referendum Law, which sets the conditions for a referendum on 
constitutional changes voted by a two-thirds majority of each house, restricts 
free speech dealing with amendments pending Congressional votes.  Special 
permanent residents are prohibited from speaking out against constitutional 
changes by advising their neighbors what the effect of amendments on non-
citizens could be.207  The LDP-contemplated amendment would give 
government a free hand to legislate and administratively define the public 
interest and public order which speech, press, and association could not 
challenge. 
v.  Making the Family the Basic Unit of Society and Requiring Family 
Members to Take Care of Each Other 
 Under the iye family system, the extended clan family was the basic 
unit of society.  As a consequence, marriage was arranged between families.  
Article 24 of the Constitution changed this by making marriage dependent 
on the consent of the two sexes and by seeking to establish equality between 
husband and wife as the basis for laws dealing with marriage, family 
 
205 See, e.g., Nishiyama Official Secrets Case, Nishiyama v. Japan, 32 Keishu 457 (Sup. Ct., P.B. 
May 31, 1978); Ayako Mie, Ex-Mainichi reporter blasts Abe’s push for secrets bill, JAPAN TIMES (Nov. 15, 
2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/11/15/national/ex-mainichi-reporter-blasts-abes-push-for-
secrets-bill/#.Vqle74f2bIV. 
206 Jiji Press, Japan documents classified as state secrets up over a third in 2015, top 272,000, JAPAN 
TIMES (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/27/national/crime-legal/japan-
documents-classified-state-secrets-third-2015-top-272000/#.V-dIDJMrKqC; Documents Concerning Secret 
Pacts Missing, YOMIURI (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20100113TDY02308.htm; 
Secret Pact Files Probably Shredded, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Mar. 20, 2010), 
http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201003180400.html; Okinawa reversion papers ‘likely destroyed’: 
Documents disposed of to avoid exposing details: court, JAPAN TIMES (July 14, 2014), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/07/14/national/okinawa-reversion-papers-likely-
destroyed/#.Vled53arTIU. 
207 While political participation such as by voting or running for office may be limited to citizens, 
speech concerning the effect of laws or constitutional change is not political participation. It is speech 
whose ideas can be accepted or rejected by the voting public, i.e. citizens. See PAUL CLOSE & DAVID 
ASKEW, ASIA PACIFIC AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE (2004). 
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obligations, and inheritance. 208  Passage of the amendment would not only 
provide a pathway to revive Kokutai, but would remove the constitutional 
prohibition against legislation promoting the recreation of a twenty-first 
century feudal iye for all Japanese families.209 
The Japanese negotiators objected strenuously to the substance of the 
American-drafted Constitution as it affected the individual and the family as 
they sought to retain the iye system.210  While the 1947 Constitution replaces 
the clan with the nuclear family, retention of the family register, which 
retains the house terminology and requires that there be a head of house, and 
inheritance laws that are linked to family and ancestor worship, allow the 
idea of the iye to remain.211  
Unlike the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [hereinafter 
“Universal Declaration”], which recognizes the individual as a prime holder 
of human rights and the family as “the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society,” the LDP contemplates making the family the “basic unit of 
society”212 rather than simply the preeminent or fundamental group unit in 
 
208 Raising the question whether only heterosexual marriage has been constitutionalized in Japan. 
209 Legislation will likely answer questions raised by the amendment such as whether the family will 
remain the nuclear as distinguished from clan family; will it include de facto families or only families that 
are recorded in the Family Register, etc., opening the door to recreation of the prewar family that placed 
women in their historic role as “good wife and wise mother.” See BRIAN J. MCVEIGH, NATIONALISMS OF 
JAPAN: MANAGING AND MYSTIFYING IDENTITY 219239 (2006). A government minister’s comments that 
could be interpreted as blaming women for Japan’s declining population, likely echoes the “good wife and 
wise mother” ethic and is consistent with earlier statements by Japanese leaders such as that the declining 
birth rate was caused by the fact that Japanese women were highly educated. Women Could Contribute to 
Japan by Having Children: Top Gov't Spokesmen, MAINICHI (Oct. 2, 2015), 
http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150930p2a00m0na009000c.html; Halloway, infra 
note 214, at 4;  see also Sumiko Sekiguchi, Confucian Morals and the Making of a 'Good Wife and Wise 
Mother': From 'Between Husband and Wife there is Distinction' to 'As Husbands and Wives be 
Harmonious', 13 SOC. SCI. JAPAN J. 95, 110 (2010) (using the Imperial Rescript on Education as its guide 
good wives were obedient to their husband and there was division of labor between husband and wife - he 
pursuing matters outside the home and she matters inside the home); Koyama Shizuko and Gabriel A. 
Sylvain, The "Good Wife and Wise Mother" Ideology in Post-World War I Japan, 7 U.S.-JAPAN WOMEN'S 
JOURNAL, English Supplement 31 (1994) (adding to a woman's inside the home function the housewife 
ideal while permitting her outside activities that did not interfere with housewife obligations and arguing 
that notwithstanding women's entry into the work force the concept resonated in 1994 Japanese society). 
210 See KYOKO INOUE, supra note 8.  
211 FUMIE KUMAGAI & HIKARU SUZUKI, THE PRICE OF DEATH: THE FUNERAL INDUSTRY IN 
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 3233 (2000);  see also, Christopher S. Thompson, Book Review, 10 SOC. SCI. 
JAPAN J. 131134 (2007) (reviewing YUKIKO NAGANO, GENDAI NOSON NI OKERU IE TO JOSEI: SHONAI 
CHIHO NI MIRU REKISHI NO RENZOKU TO DANZETSU  [I.E. AND WOMEN IN MODERN RURAL SOCIETY: 
CONTINUITY  AND DISCONTINUITY IN THE HISTORY OF THE SHONAI DISTRICT, YAMAGATA PREFECTURE], 
(Tosui Shobo, 2005) (discussing the continuing effect of the feudal iye on Japanese family law.) 
212 Cf. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf, with Young Lawyer's 
Association for The Future of Freedom translation, supra note 13; Voices of Overseas Youth for Civic 
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the class of numerous group units of society, while at the same time 
denigrating the individual from its role as prime holder of rights.  The 
Universal Declaration recognizes that in the hierarchy of units (employment 
group, social club group, university class and/or alumni group, etc.) the 
family is particularly important—but not more important than the 
individuals who make up the family.  The contemplated amendment would 
make the family the fundamental societal unit, displacing the individual as 
was the case in Tokugawa Japan,213 and as it was strengthened in Meiji 
Japan, where the communal family and the Emperor's communal family 
(i.e., the family State) each replicated the other.214  This would be consistent 
with the earlier discussed amendment that would denigrate individual rights 
by removing individuality from the Constitution.  Passage of the amendment 
would not only provide a pathway to revive Kokutai, but would remove the 
constitutional prohibition against legislation promoting the recreation of a 
twenty-first century feudal iye for all Japanese families.215 
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Engagement, supra note 44. By providing that “everyone” has fundamental human rights and “no one” 
shall be denied certain rights (e.g., Article 215) the Declaration reaffirms individual rights while making 
the family group (as distinguished from some other group, e.g., the company, school class, national society, 
etc.) the fundamental group of society in Article 16.  The considered amendment to Article 24 would 
provide that the family, as distinguished from the individuals in both the family and society at large, is the 
basic unit of society. 
213 For example, criminal law in villages in feudal Japan was enforced by the goningumi (five 
families) system of shared responsibility that made each member of the five family group a guarantor of the 
good conduct of other group members.  DAVID J. LU, THE DAWN OF HISTORY TO THE LATE TOKUGAWA 
PERIOD, 209210 (1997). 
214 SUSAN D. HALLOWAY, WOMEN AND FAMILY IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 3031 (2010). 
215 Legislation will likely answer questions raised by the amendment, such as whether the family will 
remain the nuclear, as distinguished from clan family; and whether it will include de facto families or only 
families that are recorded in the Family Register, opening the door to recreation of the prewar family that 
placed women in their historic role as “good wife and wise mother”. See BRIAN J. MCVEIGH, 
NATIONALISMS OF JAPAN: MANAGING AND MYSTIFYING IDENTITY 219239 (2004). A government 
minister’s comments that could be interpreted as blaming women for Japan’s declining population likely 
echoes the “good wife and wise mother” ethic and is consistent with earlier statements by Japanese leaders 
blaming declining birth rate on the fact that Japanese women were highly educated. Women Could 
Contribute to Japan by Having Children: Top Gov't Spokesmen, MAINICHI (Oct. 2, 2015), 
http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150930p2a00m0na009000c.html.  HALLOWAY, supra 
note 214, at 4; see also Sumiko Sekiguchi, Confucian Morals and the Making of a 'Good Wife and Wise 
Mother': From 'Between Husband and Wife there is Distinction' to 'As Husbands and Wives be 
Harmonious', 13 SOC. SCI. JAPAN J. 95, 110 (2010) (using the Imperial Rescript on Education as its guide, 
good wives were obedient to their husbands and there was division of labor between husband and wife, he  
pursuing matters outside the home, she pursuing matters inside the home); Koyama Shizuko & Gabriel A. 
Sylvain, The "Good Wife and Wise Mother" Ideology in Post-World War I Japan, 7 U.S.-JAPAN WOMEN'S 
JOURNAL, English Supplement 31 (1994) (adding to a woman's inside-the-home-function the housewife 
ideal while permitting her to participate in outside activities that did not interfere with housewife 
obligations and arguing that notwithstanding women's entry into the work force the concept resonated in 
1994 Japanese society). 
62 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 26 NO. 1 
 
The Imperial Household Law [hereinafter “the Law”] provides a 
glimpse of what a modern iye could look like.  The exclusiveness of male 
imperial succession reflects the iye requirement of male inheritance of the 
head of house mantle to continue the family’s existence.216  The Law’s 
requirement that a female of the Emperor’s line who marries outside the 
imperial line be jettisoned from the imperial family also reflects the feudal 
iye.217  The imperial family is in some ways a “role model” for the “proper 
Japanese family.”  Its discrimination against female family members and 
offspring may reflect a societal norm making sexual equality difficult to 
achieve. 
The contemplated amendment would also require family members to 
care for each other—a reflection of the feudal iye.  Adoption of the 
amendment could relieve the government of a serious strain on tax revenues.  
Care extends beyond finance and includes custodial care, an obligation that 
falls to women in modern Japan.218  With an aging and declining population 
but more female university graduates, some in Japan’s government 
recognize that women are a viable alternative to importing labor from 
abroad.  An accommodation has been made between those in the ruling elite 
who consider women as “baby making machines” and those who see them 
 
216 FUMIE KUMAGAI & DONNA J. KEYSER, UNMASKING JAPAN TODAY: THE IMPACT OF TRADITIONAL 
VALUES ON MODERN JAPANESE SOCIETY 1516 (1996). Male primogeniture, under which the eldest son 
inherited the head of house position, was part of the iye. WILLIAM NOEL, THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN JAPAN 60 
(1997). Meiji Japan allowed a female to inherit the head of house status if there were no male heirs. 
217 THE IMPERIAL HOUSE LAW, art. 12, http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/hourei-01.html. As a 
consequence, her children are not in the line of succession. Emperor Akihito has two sons and a daughter. 
His married daughter is no longer in the Imperial family; any children she may have will not be in the 
Imperial line. The Crown Prince is married and has a daughter. His younger brother was the father of two 
girls when the daughter of the crown prince was born. Dynastic succession was at risk as surrogate 
pregnancy, birth to a concubine, or adoption is not allowed for succession. Amendment of The Imperial 
House Law was considered, including allowing females in the imperial family to create cadet families 
whose male members would be available for succession.  Agreement could not be reached. It appears no 
serious consideration was given to allowing for an Empress (although Article 14 of the Constitution 
prohibits gender discrimination in political, economic, or social relations). Consistent with the role of 
younger sons in feudal Japan to father a standby head of house in waiting, the Crown Prince’s sister-in-law 
at age 39 delivered a son who is the dynastic successor in the generation after the Crown Prince.  The 
problem may arise again if the young heir apparent after the Crown Prince fails to produce a male heir. 
WINKLER, supra note 78, at 2535; Colin P.A. Jones, And then there was one?: Japan’s Right Royal Crisis, 
JAPAN TIMES, (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2012/01/17/issues/and-then-there-
was-one-japans-right-royal-crisis/#.VG5KyLl0xjo.  
218 Kumiko Fujimura-Fanselow, The Japanese Ideology of 'Good Wives and Wise Mothers': Trends in 
Contemporary Research, 3 GENDER AND HISTORY 345, 348 (1991) (noting that Japanese leaders continue 
to promote the ideology that care is the provenance of daughters and daughters-in-law).  Fujimura-
Fanselow also ties the iye and imperial Emperor and the House system to the concept of the Good Wife and 
Wise Mother in the prewar and war period. 
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as a national resource for other reasons.219  New laws designed to ease the 
burden of working women have provided some access to child care centers 
and maternity and child care leave laws have recently been enacted.  Even 
Japan’s definition of gender discrimination has been modified to some 
degree to relieve the on-the-job burden of working women.  These laws have 
had a positive effect; but waiting lists for child care centers are long220 and 
social acceptance is far from universal.221  Japan’s definition of gender 
discrimination has been moderated in some work settings so that the general 
rule, which does not recognize gender (or any other) discrimination as long 
as the law is facially neutral,222 has been moderated to recognize “indirect 
discrimination” (what in United States law would be “effect discrimination”) 
when employers use dual track (career/non-career) hiring systems.223  
Adoption of the contemplated amendment will, as a practical if not legal 
 
219 Japan women called child machines, BBC NEWS, (Jan. 27, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/6306685.stm. 
220 Isabel Reynolds, Lack of Childcare is Hurting Japanese Push to Put More Women to Work, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-30/japan-s-
childcare-backlog-hampers-abe-push-to-put-women-to-work. 
221 See, e.g., Jonathan Soble, To Rescue Economy, Japan Turns to Supermom, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 1, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/02/business/international/in-economic-revival-effort-japan-turns-
to-its-women.html?mwrsm=Email&_r=0 (noting the difficulty of getting Japanese corporate and societal 
culture to change and ease the path for working women); Mark Fabian, Childcare not the only cost for 
working women in Japan, EAST ASIA FORUM, (Sept. 16 2014),  
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/09/16/childcare-not-the-only-cost-for-working-women-in-japan/. 
222 For example, since either the husband or wife’s family name can be chosen for a family name at 
marriage, the Family Register Law requirement of a single family name is constitutional notwithstanding 
that over 95% of Japanese families register under the husband’s family name.  Tomohiro Osaki, Japan's 
top court upholds the same-name rule for married couples, overturns remarriage moratorium for women, 
JAPAN TIMES, (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/12/16/national/crime-legal/japans-
top-court-strikes-rules-divorcee-remarriage/#.Vqu1Dof2bIV. On its face, the law is neutral – societal 
pressures likely cause the large difference between men and women. Professional women are especially 
harmed by the law’s requirement that such women choose between marriage under the new husband’s 
surname and the reputation they have established under their father’s surname. Many social welfare 
policies such as the subsidy for large families and health care are linked to and paid to the head of house. 
These policies disadvantage the wife who finds it difficult to leave an unhappy marriage because benefits 
flow through the husband. It is reported that in reaching its decision the Court referred to both the societal 
history of a single family name (this arises from the iye clan family system) and also noted that single 
family names “enable” a person to inform others that they are part of a family. Id. Of course, the law does 
far more than enable people – it requires women to inform others that they are part of their husband’s 
family – as the prewar iye required. 
223 Under recent legislation, “indirect discrimination” is recognized so that Japanese employers who 
employ two track hiring systems (one track for career—management—positions, overwhelmingly held by 
men, and a second track for non-career positions held by part-timers and contract workers, predominantly 
women) must prove necessity when adopting:  a) height, weight, and strength requirements; b) promotion 
practices based on experience at multiple locations; and c) willingness to transfer to numerous locations, as 
condition for career track hiring. These last reflect the cultural imperative that women are expected to stay 
where the children are and not move the family home. See GOODMAN, supra note 88, at 208211. 
64 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 26 NO. 1 
 
matter, further burden women’s opportunities in Japan and might set back 
hard fought gains as women would once again lose their individual rights 
and be subsumed by their family obligations and second class status within 
the family.224  
Making the family the basic unit of Japanese society should not be 
viewed in isolation.  It relates to the contemplated change to remove 
individuality from the Constitution and to make the Emperor Head of State. 
Under the iye, there was no personal individuality and little individual 
property.  Individuality was lost in the communal body of the clan family 
where personal attachments, wants, and desires were superseded by the good 
of the communal family, and after the Restoration, subordinate to the 
interests of the family State.225  Removal of individuality and designation of 
the family as the basic unit of society may be based on a desire to recreate, 
to the extent possible in a modern world, the iye system reestablishing the 
“pure nature” of the Japanese state that existed in the Meiji period when 
such purity and Kokutai was related to both the family system and rejection 
of individualism.226  To those who may seek to return all Japanese to one 
family under a Head of state emperor, the concept of iye, with its ties to 
ancestor worship as a link to the Emperor, is central to the Family State227 
and Kokutai.228 
vi.   Amendment by Cabinet Declaration? Article 9 and Renunciation of 
War 
Article 9 of the Constitution is an illustration of “be careful what you 
wish for, you may get it.”  In Article 9 Japan renounces war and the threat of 
force to resolve international disputes. 229  War potential such as the army, 
 
224 By placing such a provision in the Constitution, courts likely would be presented with the 
argument that a statutory requirement of non-sex discrimination in the work environment must be weighed 
against the constitutional requirement for family care – a woman’s duty. Prime Minister Abe’s goal is to 
have women occupy seven percent for national public servants and fifteen percent for local government 
officials.  That goal is nowhere near achievement. Mizuho Aoki, Japan Drastically Lowers its Goal for 
Female Managers in Government and Private Sector, JAPAN TIMES, (Dec. 25, 2015), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/12/25/national/japan-drastically-lowers-its-goal-for-female-
managers-in-government-and-private-sector/#.VqvZvYf2bIV. 
225 Smith, supra note 78, at 33; KENNETH B. PYLE, JAPAN RISING 120125 (2007). 
226 DOWER, supra note 85, at 221223 (discussing the Ministry of Education Manual Cardinal 
Principles of the National Polity (Kokutai)); Fundamentals of Our National Polity, excerpts and discussion 
at Tsunoda et. al., supra note 29, at 278288. 
227 Kawamura, supra note 77, at 156. 
228 QUIGLEY & TURNER, supra note 89, at 140, 157. 
229 KENPO, art. 9 provides: 
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navy, and air force are not to be maintained, and the State’s right of 
belligerency is not recognized.230  No mention is made of Japan’s right to 
defend itself against outside attack or to enter into mutual or collective 
defense treaties. 
At the start of the Occupation, disarmament and policies that 
prevented Japan from again becoming a military power was uppermost in 
the mind of the Occupation.  The Initial Post Surrender Policy Directive (IPS 
Directive JCS1380/15) called for Japanese demilitarization and 
disarmament.231  The Cold War changed the geopolitical situation and as 
United States policy towards the Far East and as the perceived Soviet threat 
developed, Article 9 became an impediment to America’s containment 
policy.232   
The Ashida Amendment to Article 9, which added language that 
hinged the prohibition of a Japanese military force to aspiration for 
international peace and also hinged the prohibition of military force to 
carrying out the aims of international peace, made room for the argument 
that it is an aggressive military rather than a defensive military that is 
prohibited.233  Prohibiting aggression is consistent with the Kellogg Briand 
Pact, a source from which the concept of Renunciation of War was 
borrowed.234  Article 9 has been interpreted by the Japanese government to 
    
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of 
force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the 
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never 
be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 
The Ashida Amendment adopted by the Diet and accepted by the Occupation consists of the 11 words of 
the first paragraph (Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,) and the first 
10 words of the second paragraph (In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,). 
230  Id. 
231 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, BASIC DIRECTIVE FOR POST-SURRENDER MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN 
JAPAN PROPER (Nov. 3, 1945) http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/036/036tx.html. 
232 HOWARD B. SCHONBERGER, AFTERMATH OF WAR 240–278 (1989). 
233 The Ashida Amendment added the following language to the American draft. Article 9 as set out 
in KENPO supra note 229: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,” and “In 
order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph.”  
234 The draft Constitution for the Philippines written in 1935 contained a Renunciation of War clause 
and McArthur’s close ties to the Philippines suggest he was aware of the renunciation clause. KOSEKI 
SHOICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN’S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION 82–86 (Ray A. Moore trans., 1997); see also 
Office of the Historian, The Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1928, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/kellogg; Henry Cabot Lodge, The Kellogg-Briand Peace 
Pact: A Contemporary Criticism, 1928–29, TEACHING AMERICAN HISTORY (Dec. 1928), 

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permit Japan’s Self Defense Force (SDF), although the role of the SDF is 
restrained by the Constitution, legislation, and administrative opinion by the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), the organ of government with 
responsibility to advise the government (i.e., the Cabinet) concerning 
whether legislation or administrative action is consistent with the 
Constitution.235   CLB is a standalone government bureau under the Prime 
Minister; the opinions of the CLB are given great weight by all branches of 
the government—legislative, executive and judicial.  It has been suggested 
that opinions of the CLB are so significant that the Supreme Court of Japan 
follows them rather than its own view.236  Recent debate in Japan has 
focused not on the legality of the existence of the SDF but on what use may 
be made of such force, where it may be deployed, who it may defend, what 
weapons it may possess, and how much force it can apply. 
The Abe Administration initially sought to amend Article 9 by way of 
a two-step process.  In the first step, Article 96 (the amendment Article) 
would be changed to require only a majority vote of each Diet house to send 
amendments to referendum; once that was achieved, step two would be to 
significantly amend Article 9.237  When polls indicated the Japanese public 
would not support this path, the debate shifted from formal amendment to 
achieving the government’s objective by the Government simply adopting a 
new and different interpretation of Article 9.238  Assuming interpretation 
sufficient, the debate shifted to what was the relevant body to make such 
new interpretation.  The competing bodies were the CLB and the Cabinet.  
Consistent with Japanese government policy to use Article 9 to limit 
Japan’s military budget and commitments to allied countries such as the 
    
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/the-kellogg-briand-peace-pact-a-contemporary-
criticism-1928-29/. 
235 The Supreme Court of Japan has never directly addressed the question of the constitutionality of 
the SDF, avoiding the issue through procedural doctrines although dicta indicate the SDF is constitutional. 
Questions concerning the scope and limitations on the SDF have been opined on by the CLB. See About the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Cabinet Legislation Bureau, http://www.clb.go.jp/english/about.html. 
236 Jonathon David Marshall, Democratizing the Law in Japan, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
JAPANESE POLITICS 92, 94 (Alisa Gaunder, ed., 2011); Jun-ichi Satoh, Judicial Review in Japan: An 
Overview of the Case Law and an Examination of Trends in the Japanese Supreme Court’s Constitutional 
Oversight, 41 LOY. L. REV. 603, 605, 624625 (2008). 
237 This had the advantage of using fear of an assertive and resurgent China and a reclusive but 
nuclear North Korea to rid the Constitution of both the two-thirds threshold required by Article 96 and to 
“liberate” Japan from restrictions on its use of military forces. 
238 Jeremy A. Yellen, Shinzo Abe’s Constitutional Ambitions, THE DIPLOMAT, (June 12, 2014), 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/shinzo-abes-constitutional-ambitions/. 
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United States,239 the CLB had previously opined that Article 9 limited 
military action to the minimum necessary for Japan’s defense and that 
collective self-defense was not permitted.240  To achieve a shift in the CLB’s 
interpretation, Prime Minister Abe filled a vacancy on the Supreme Court 
with the head of the CLB (who opposed reinterpretation of Article 9) and 
then appointed a non-CLB member (who favored changing the interpretation 
of Article 9) to head the CLB.241  When the new head became seriously ill, 
the government changed its approach to one that rejected a role of the CLB 
in the interpretation question and instead relied on a new Cabinet 
interpretation of Article 9. 242 
A “Cabinet Declaration” is not mentioned in the Constitution, which 
makes the Diet, not the Cabinet, the highest and sole law-making branch of 
the State.243  The Cabinet declared that Article 9 permitted the SDF to 
engage in collective self-defense, i.e., to aid other countries in certain 
circumstances, including military attack on the assets of such foreign nations 
and other circumstances that endangered the Japanese population’s pursuit 
of happiness.244  An embargo of oil such as the pre-Pacific War American 
 
239 See Michael J. Green, The US-Japan Alliance: A Brief Strategic History, 12 EDUC. ABOUT ASIA 
25 (2007). 
240 PYLE, supra note 225, at 236, 254–255; EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY & IAN E. RINEHART, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL33740, THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE, (2016), available at 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf; see also Michael Green, The Challenges of Managing US-Japan 
Security Relations after the Cold War, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS 241 (Gerald L. 
Curtis ed. 2000), http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/NewPerspectives/new_green.pdf. 
241 Yellen, supra note 238. 
242 Reiji Yoshida, Abe’s man in Cabinet law office steps down, JAPAN TIMES, (May 16, 2014), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/05/16/national/politics-diplomacy/cabinet-law-office-shake-slow-
abes-military-drive/#.U-GPFSx0wdU. 
243 “The Diet shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be the sole law-making organ of the 
State.” NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 41 (Japan). The Diet is the organ of the State 
whose entire membership is elected by the people. Only a majority of the Cabinet need be elected members 
of the Diet, and all Cabinet members are appointed by the Prime Minister, who has authority to remove 
them at will: “[t]he Prime Minister shall appoint the Ministers of State. However, a majority of their 
number must be chosen from among the members of the Diet. The Prime Minister may remove the 
Ministers of State as he chooses.” Id. art. 68. 
244 Three conditions for exercising collective self-defense were placed in the Declaration: 1) a clear 
threat to Japan and/or its peoples’ rights to life, liberty or pursuit of happiness; 2) collective self-defense 
must be the only alternative available; 3) force is limited to minimum necessary force. CHANLETT-AVERY 
& RINEHART, supra note 240, at 4; see also Jeff Kingston, Commentary, Abe’s constitutional putsch and 
U.S. security cooperation, JAPAN TIMES, (July 12, 2014), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/07/12/commentary/abes-constitutional-putsch-u-s-security-
cooperation/#.U-FqiSx0wdU. 
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Embargo or a cut off of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf that could be 
interpreted to endanger the public’s right to happiness might suffice to set 
aside Article 9’s Renunciation of War Clause.245  No opinion of the CLB on 
the constitutionality of such declaration was sought and when the CLB was 
presented with the declaration it took no formal action and kept no notes of 
any discussions it may have had concerning the declaration246 (although 
there is strong argument that Japan’s public records law requires the keeping 
of such notes) apparently simply accepting it as a fait accompli.247  The Diet 
(controlled by the LDP and Komeito) then adopted legislation expanding the 
role of the SDF in accord with the declaration. 
The declaration does not contain a NATO type “attack on one is an 
attack on all” commitment and leaves to Japan’s government both the 
ultimate questions of whether an attack on a country allied with Japan meets 
the Cabinet declaration’s required clear threat to Japan’s sovereignty or the 
right of its people to pursue happiness and the level of military action Japan 
may take in response.248  The declaration is supportive of United States 
policy and the Japan/U.S. Alliance and was welcomed by United States 
 
245 Prime Minister Abe has suggested Japan could use mine sweepers as part of collective self-
defense if mines interrupted global oil supplies interfering with citizen’s pursuit of happiness. Collective 
defense right limited: Abe, JAPAN NEWS (July 14, 2014), http://the-japan-
news.com/news/article/0001423669. The defense of some of the defendants at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial 
was based, in part, on the assertion that the United States rather than Japan began the Pacific War as the 
U.S. embargo of high octane aviation fuel was an act of economic warfare. For more on Koichi Kido’s use 
of this defense argument at the War Crimes Trial, see EDWARD J. MILLER, BANKRUPTING THE ENEMY 242 
(2007). This argument disregards the actions of Japan leading up to the embargo (Japan’s aggressive war in 
China and Japanese expansion to French Indochina) and disregards the difference between a blockade, 
which is an Act of War because it relies on belligerency, i.e., military force, to prevent willing sellers from 
selling product to a belligerent, while an embargo is a country’s voluntary restriction of its own actions and 
the actions of those subject to its domestic law from exporting product to a foreign state. At the time of the 
U.S. embargo, there was no international agreement between Japan and the United States that required the 
United States to permit its nationals to trade with Japan. There is no rule of international law that requires a 
country, absent a treaty obligation to the contrary, to cede its freedom to refuse to trade with another 
country because the other country “needs” the products the embargoing country refuses to sell. Abe’s 
comment echoing Japan’s prewar actions reflects a theory of entitlement that international law does not 
support. See FORREST E. MORGAN, COMPELLENCE AND STRATEGIC CULTURE OF IMPERIAL JAPAN 174 
(2003).  
246 Cabinet Legislation Bureau has no record of Constitution reinterpretation deliberations, 
MAINICHI (Sept. 21, 2015), 
http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150928p2a00m0na035000c.html. 
247 Government skipped recording debate over constitutional reinterpretation, JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 
28, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/28/national/politics-diplomacy/government-skipped-
recording-debate-over-constitutional-reinterpretation/. 
248 North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 
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officials.249  The declaration and security legislation passed to carry out the 
declaration may reflect a break with Japan’s historic use of Article 9 to limit 
its commitments to allies (the United States in particular).  It is an advance 
towards the United States objective of a truly mutual defense agreement and 
mutual defense commitments between the United States and Japan which 
permits Japan to shoot down missiles headed toward the United States and 
defend United States military assets.250  It also reflects a Japan that has 
become much more involved with like-minded countries, i.e., those 
concerned about China.251  While retaining the importance of self-defense 
(i.e., defense of Japanese territory or its people) as a prerequisite for 
Japanese military action,252 adoption of a collective self-defense posture is a 
 
249 Hagel Welcomes Japan’s New Collective Self-defense Policy, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. NEWS (July 1, 
2014), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122591; CHANLETT-AVERY & RINEHART, supra 
note 240, at 4. 
250 The issue of how far the Cabinet Declaration permits Japanese military action is one for the 
Japanese government to decide. The joint U.S.-Japan military guidelines were amended in April 2015. 
Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, U.S.-Japan (April 27, 2015), http://www.us.emb-
japan.go.jp/english/html/Guidelines_for_Japan_US_Defense_Cooperation.pdf; see also Kyle Mizokami, 
Inside the New U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, USNI NEWS (April 29, 2015), 
https://news.usni.org/2015/04/29/inside-the-new-u-s-japan-defense-guidelines. The revised guidelines take 
into account Japan’s new approach to collective self-defense and joint Naval Operations and Drills 
undertaken by Japan, and the United States will help interpret (and perhaps expand) the Guidelines. See 
Bruce Klinger, Japanese Defense Reform Supports Allied Security Objectives, BACKGROUNDER (The 
Heritage Foundation) (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/01/japanese-defense-
reform-supports-allied-security-objectives.  
251 See, e.g., Brahma Chellaney, China pushes natural allies India, Japan closer to US, THE SUNDAY 
GUARDIAN (May 30, 2010), http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/china-pushes-natural-allies-india-
japan-closer-to-us; Mina Pollmann, Japan and India's Warming Defense Ties, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 4, 
2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/japan-and-indias-warming-defense-ties/; Prashanth Parameswaran, 
Japanese Destroyers Visit Vietnam’s Cam Ranch Bay in Historic Move, THE DIPLOMAT (Apr. 13, 2016), 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/japanese-destroyers-visit-vietnams-cam-ranh-bay-in-historic-move/; Kim 
Gamel, US, South Korea and Japan to Hold Anti-Missile Exercise, STARS AND STRIPES (May 16, 2016), 
http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/us-south-korea-and-japan-to-hold-anti-missile-exercise-1.409754. 
252 Green, supra note 239. It must be emphasized that in determining what collective self-defense 
actions are permitted by the Declaration restrictions in the Declaration and legislation still contain restraints 
on the use of the military (e.g., minimum force necessary). See To win over Komeito, LDP modifies rules 
for Japan's use of force, NIKKEI ASIAN REVIEW (June 24, 2016), http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-
Economy/Policy-Politics/To-win-over-New-Komeito-LDP-modifies-rules-for-Japan-s-use-of-force. Such 
restraints reinforce the “go slow” attitude Japan’s political leaders have endorsed for seventy years, raising 
questions about how much collective self-defense Japan will actually exercise when and if assets of a 
country close to Japan (e.g., the United States) are attacked. See Adam P. Liff, Japan’s Defense Policy: Abe 
the Evolutionary, 38 THE WASH. Q. 79, 85–92, 94 (2015); see also Michael Green and Jeffrey W. Hornung, 
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significant break from Japan’s postwar past.  At the same time, Japan’s 
government is also taking action to scale back the role of civilian watchdogs 
while increasing the authority of military officers.253  This may make it 
easier and faster for Japan to come to the aid of an allied country but it 
reduces civilian control over the military. 
The Cabinet declaration raises severe rule of law questions,254 
especially as the declaration route replaced a legal opinion255 without 
providing any reasoned explanation of why the interpretation of Article 9 
accepted by governments headed by LDP as well as other political parties 
for seventy years and supported by opinions of the CLB has suddenly 
changed.256  By avoiding use of the Amendment Article (Article 96) to 
change the meaning of Article 9, Japan’s government has engaged in a form 
of “stealth amendment” of the Constitution, depriving the people of their 
right to be protected against Government action changing long established 
principles set out in the Constitution.257  If seventy years of consistent 
constitutional interpretation by the government and the bureau with 
responsibility for giving constitutional interpretations that conditions the 
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Ten Myths About Japan’s Collective Self-Defense Change, THE DIPLOMAT (July 10, 2014), 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/ten-myths-about-japans-collective-self-defense-change/. 
253 Defense Ministry's new SDF planning procedures give uniformed personnel more control, 
MAINICHI (Mar. 12, 2016), http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160312/p2a/00m/0na/021000c; Nina 
Pollmann, Japan’s Defense Ministry Seeks to Roll Back Civilian Control, THE DIPLOMAT (Feb. 28, 2015), 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/japans-defense-ministry-seeks-to-roll-back-civilian-control/. 
254 See, e.g., Craig Martin, The Case Against Revising Interpretations of the Japanese Constitution, 5 
THE ASIA-PAC. J.: JAPAN FOCUS 1 (2007), http://apjjf.org/-Craig-Martin/2434/article.html. 
255 See, e.g., Kan Hideki, U.S. Global Strategy and Japan’s Right to Exercise Collective Self-Defense: 
A Historical Perspective, 37 NANZAN REV. OF AM. STUD. 71 (2015). 
256 For example, there was no effort by the Cabinet to show that the original intent of the Constitution 
drafters was to allow collective self-defense or that the purpose of Article 9 would be better served by the 
new interpretation (neither could be shown as the original intent was to renounce war and have no Army, 
Navy or Air Force and the purpose of Article 9 was to protect the United States and its Allies of the day 
(which at the close of the War included China and the Soviet Union) from a militarily armed Japan) nor 
was the interpretation designed to read Article 9 in a way that comports with the modern view of the 
Japanese public, a kind of “national ethos.” The public had rejected amendment of Article 96 to allow a 
change in Article 9 to be presented to the people for a referendum vote by a majority vote of both houses of 
the Diet leaving the LDP with the Cabinet declaration alternative to achieve the LDP’s purpose. 
Demonstrations against the security laws based on the new interpretation show that the public is hardly 
convinced that the new interpretation reflects their view of Japan as a pacifist country. See Robert Post, 
Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13, 18, 35–6 (1990).   
257 Cf. Aurelia George Mulgan, Ishihara’s Stealth Attack on the Japanese Constitution, THE 
DIPLOMAT (Nov. 8, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/tag/shintaro-ishihara/; Richard Albert, Constitutional 
Amendment by Stealth, 60 MCGILL L.J. 673 (2015), 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1944&context=lsfp. 
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military to self-defense and thus the Ashida Amendment can be blinked 
away by the declaration of the executive branch acting on its own, can such 
declarations be used to “amend” other constitutional provisions such as the 
freedoms and rights provisions of the Constitution?  If so, what is the 
function of a written constitution’s Bill of Rights and amendment provisions 
and how does the public cabin Cabinet declared interpretations?  The history 
of Article 9 has been a history of incremental interpretations expanding the 
role of Japan’s Self Defense Force but never tampering with the self-defense 
rationale for the forces existence and use.  Does this history make 
interpretation of Article 9 sui generous?258  Of course, a party with a legal 
injury caused by government action and standing to sue may seek a judicial 
determination that such action (not raising a political question) should be set 
aside as unconstitutional.  Japan’s Supreme Court is specifically given 
constitutional judicial review authority259 but rarely exercises it.260  
In the run up to the legislation carrying out the Cabinet Declaration a 
Supreme Court Justice,261 a former Chief Justice,262 as well as three 
constitutional scholars invited to testify before a Diet Committee (including 
one who the LDP had asked to testify) opined that the legislation was 
unconstitutional.263  The Supreme Court of Japan, using procedural 
doctrines, has never directly addressed the question of the constitutionality 
 
258 Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, Neither Legal Nor Political? Bureaucratic Constitutionalism in Japanese 
Law, 26 KING’S LAW JOURNAL 193 (2015). 
259 “The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any 
law, order, regulation or official act.” NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 81 (Japan).  
260 See CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 110–25 (3d ed. 
2012). 
261 Amendment ‘needed’ for shift on self-defense, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 21, 2013), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/08/21/national/amendment-needed-for-shift-on-self-
defense/#.VXhAc7nbLIV. 
262 Ex-Supreme Court chief justice raps Abe's security reforms, JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 4, 2015), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/04/national/politics-diplomacy/ex-supreme-court-chief-justice-
raps-abes-security-reforms/#.V8tfyVdiNmA. 
263 Former Cabinet Legislation Bureau chiefs criticize security bills, MAINICHI (June 23, 2015); Mari 
Yamaguchi, Constitutional questions grow over Japan PM's military plans, MILITARY TIMES (June 10, 
2015), http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/06/10/constitutional-questions-grow-over-japan-
pms-military-plans/71010438/; Tetsuya Watanabe, Triple shot: Scholars say security legislation 
‘unconstitutional,’ ASAHI SHIMBUN (June 5, 2015); Security bills’ handling worries LDP: Scholar’s 
testimony a surprise ‘gift’ to DPJ in security debate, THE DAILY YOMIURI (June 7, 2015); Reiji Yoshida, 
Experts’ tongue-lashing rekindles Diet debate on reinterpreted Constitution, JAPAN TIMES (June 5, 2015), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/05/national/politics-diplomacy/experts-blast-constitutional-
reinterpretation-lower-house-session/#.V4eSho-cHIV. 
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of the SDF; although Supreme Court dicta indicate the SDF is constitutional.  
Considering the Court’s reticence to deal with constitutional issues the CLB 
has taken this role and is considered by some as a guardian of the 
Constitution.264  Considering the Supreme Court of Japan’s deferential 
approach to constitutional issues (including those surrounding Article 9) and 
the role of the CLB in constitutional interpretation it is fair to ask whether 
positions taken by the CLB in early opinions are entitled to a kind of “stare 
decisis” affect at least until set aside by a new reasoned CLB opinion or the 
judiciary or at least a reasoned legal explanation by the government.265  
Rather than using the means provided by the Constitution to amend the 
Constitution (or utilizing the CLB to reverse previous CLB opinions based 
on a reasoned explanation) the LDP has “reinterpreted” Article 9 and while 
it still wants to amend the language of Article 9, it no longer sees such 
amendment as a priority.  Rather, amendment to Article 9, which was for 
many years the rallying call for constitutional amendment, can be relegated 
to a future date, after other amendments have been approved by two-thirds 
of each Diet and presented to the public for referendum vote.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
It is well to recall that it is constitutional amendment – a change in the 
fundamental law that determines the relative powers of the executive, the 
legislative and the people—not amendment of a statute that the LDP seeks.  
The amendment language itself will have consequences for the people of 
Japan that would change their current society, but more significant is the 
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japans-national-security-moves/; Craig Martin, Opinion, ‘Reinterpreting’ Article 9 endangers Japan’s rule 
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under United States pressure, provided assistance to American forces in Iraq. Some portions of that 
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removal of constitutional barriers to legislation and administrative action 
that could dramatically and negatively affect the rights, liberties and 
freedoms of citizens in modern Japan.   
The considered amendments discussed in this article would 
dramatically change the current Constitution from a document designed to 
limit and regulate the power of the State vis a vis the people, to one that 
emphasizes both the power and authority of the State and the duties and 
obligations of citizens to the State as representative of the community of 
Japanese citizens.  The package of amendments the LDP is contemplating 
and are discussed herein opens a path to reestablishment of the pre-war 
Kokutai, the pre-war iye family system, and the pre-war autocratic state.  
The government would be permitted to determine when and if the public 
order required limitations on rights mentioned but not guaranteed by the 
Constitution such as freedom of association and speech.  As in pre-war 
Japan, people could think what they want but the moment they 
communicated such thoughts or organized to democratically make such 
thoughts government policy, their “right” could terminate by determination 
that such actions are not in the public interest or do not support public order.  
The problem with the contemplated amendments as a package is not 
simply that they reject fundamental human rights, free speech, and 
constitutional limits on the governing elite and Cabinet once an emergency 
has been declared—all of which are serious problems not to be 
underestimated—but also that in many respects, the package would bring 
Japanese governance (and society) back to the undemocratic Meiji 
Constitution.  In doing so, the amendments would sow the seeds for the 
potential destruction of the form of democracy that the Japanese people are 
continuing to develop to create a more representative state.266  As a whole, 
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the amendments are not an attempt to create a twenty-first century postwar 
Constitution, but rather to resurrect a flawed nineteenth century Constitution 
based on myth and dreams of unique superiority.   
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